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Abstract
Why do autocrats allow legislatures, parties and elections? These nominally democratic in-
stitutions are thought to be fundamental pillars of democracies, yet they have been common
features of authoritarian regimes in the post-World War II period. I argue that autocrats use
these institutions to deter the threat of being overthrown by regime elites. More specifically,
they contribute to co-optation of potential rivals by sharing power and spoils, gather informa-
tion about the opposition and credibly reinforce the perception of the ruling clique’s right to
continued rule. Several recent studies have illustrated a relationship between institutions un-
der authoritarianism and the longevity of authoritarian rule. However, although most scholars
concede that regime elites are both the most pervasive threat to authoritarian rulers and the
targets of co-optation strategies, studies of institutions under authoritarianism overwhelmingly
focus on the diverse category of regime breakdowns. In order to account for this drawback of
previous research, I turn my attention to coup attempts, a threat to incumbents that in most
cases involves regime elites, and thus more precisely captures the core argument.
In accordance with previous research addressing regime longevity, I find that autocrats ruling
with nominally democratic institutions are less likely to be subjected to both coup attempts
and successful coups. The findings provide evidence for the proposed theoretical relationship
in which authoritarian leaders credibly share their power with potential rivals in a legislature,
a regime support party and display strength through elections. However, I find no evidence
that institutional differences between autocracies with some variant of nominally democratic
institutions in place differ in their propensity to be subjected to a coup attempt.
In sum, the results strengthen the claim that nominally democratic institutions under au-
thoritarianism are effective tools for co-optation and deterrence of regime elites. It is clear that
the institutional characteristics of autocracies matter for the propensity to be subjected to a
coup attempt, and should therefore be further scrutinized, especially whether differences in in-
stitutional design matters. Moreover, the approach of this thesis underlines that disaggregating
regime breakdown and concentrating on more homogenous events such as coup attempts is a
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Why do autocrats allow legislatures, parties and elections? These nominally democratic in-
stitutions are thought to be fundamental pillars of democracies, yet they have been common
features of authoritarian regimes in the post-World War II period. Previous research has pro-
vided two principal accounts for institutions under authoritarianism. First, that institutions are
mere “window dressing” (e.g. Friedrich and Brzezinski in Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1292).
In this view, institutions are not determined by any conditions under which they emerged, and
they do not influence norms, beliefs or actions. In other words, neither do institutions play a
mediating role in affecting outcomes, nor do they directly affect outcomes. Second, nominally
democratic institutions are often seen as incompatible with the nature of the authoritarian state.
The story goes that by gradually opening the door to a more pluralistic society, incumbents are
allowing institutions that ultimately mean the end of their reign. There are essentially two pos-
sible outcomes of the “liberalization” of autocracies: either the supporters of a more repressive
state will attempt a coup to stop the deterioration of the regime, or alternatively, the liberaliz-
ing policies result in a democratic transition because the masses are gradually becoming more
involved (O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986). I argue, on the contrary, that autocrats
use nominally democratic institutions to deter the threat of being overthrown by regime elites.
More specifically, they contribute to co-optation of potential rivals by sharing power and spoils,
gather information about the opposition and credibly reinforce the perception of the ruling
clique’s right to continued rule. Several recent studies have illustrated a relationship between
institutions under authoritarianism and the longevity of authoritarian rule (e.g. Gandhi and
Przeworski 2007, 2006; Geddes 2006, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Magaloni 2008, 2010;
Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Svolik 2010; Wright 2008a,b, 2011). However, although most scholars
concede that regime elites are both the most pervasive threat to authoritarian rulers and the
targets of co-optation strategies, studies of institutions under authoritarianism overwhelmingly
focus on the diverse category of regime breakdowns. In order to account for this drawback of
previous research, I turn my attention to coup attempts, a threat to incumbents that in most
cases involves regime elites, and thus more precisely captures the core argument.
1
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1.1 Why Coup Attempts?
As urged by Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009), this thesis provides insight into whether recent
theories on why autocrats allow legislatures, parties and arrange elections are valid or not.
Magaloni and Kricheli (2010, 126) also suggest that ‘focusing on the strategies dictators follow
to appease simultaneous threats to their stability from within the elites and from within the
masses’ is an important aspect missing from the current literature.
I propose that nominally democratic institutions help shape outcomes in authoritarian
regimes. They contribute to co-optation and deterrence of potential rival elites, and thus lower
the risk of coup attempts. I identify two mechanisms through which these institutions work.
First, legislatures and parties establish a credible power-sharing relationship with the civilian
and military elites. Legislatures and parties commit the ruling clique to not abuse their superior
position by institutionalizing some power in the hands of a broadened group of elite citizens.
By sharing power in a credible way, trust is established between the ruling clique and a larger
number of influential elites in an environment normally characterized by secrecy and uncertainty.
Moreover, legislators and party members are offered spoils and the possibility to advance in the
ranks of the regime. During the 70-year long rule of Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
in Mexico for instance, leadership rotation was institutionalized, and distinguished members of
the party were allowed to run for office. These circumstances generated incentives for elites to
work in the interest of the regime rather than attempting to overthrow it. Second, by arranging
and convincingly “winning” elections, autocrats publicly display that they are “the only game
in town”. “Winning” elections by large margins communicate to both the elites and the masses
that the current incumbents are near invincible. Such a display of the ruling clique’s right to
continued rule reinforces the perception that the regime is likely to last into the future. More-
over, elections can also help the ruling clique identify popular opposition candidates and then
decide how to react. Potential rivals are thus deterred from attempting a coup against people
who provide them with riches and influence.
Previous research on elite co-optation and deterrence has focused on regime breakdowns, a
heterogenous group of events that can involve coups, revolutions, civil wars, democratization
or mere changes to the institutional framework. The complexity of the events and numerous
actors involved in regime breakdowns make it hard to know whether the outcome is driven by
potential rivals within the regime elite or other actors such as the masses, foreign interventionists
or rebel groups. By narrowing the focus to coup attempts, a form of anti-regime activity that is
more closely connected to regime elites, be it civilian or military, the outcome group is not only
more homogenous but also more in tune with the proposed theoretical mechanisms. In fact, the
definition of a coup attempt involves that the attempted overthrow is performed by members
of the state apparatus, most often the elite. Throughout the thesis, successful overthrows of the
incumbent will be referred to as coups, while unsuccessful endeavors are labeled unsuccessful coup
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attempts. More generally, a coup attempt ‘includes illegal and overt attempts by the military
or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive’, whether successful
or not (Powell and Thyne 2011, 252). Additionally, merely focusing on actual breakdowns is
inaccurate, because a regime in which incumbents are continually subjected to unsuccessful coups
is undoubtedly weaker than autocracies in which incumbents are not. By ignoring unsuccessful
coups that do not result in a regime breakdown, valuable information is discarded.
If it is true that nominally democratic institutions are instrumental in deterring elites from
attempting to overthrow the incumbent, they should decrease the chances of coup attempts.
With this in mind, I expect that both successful and unsuccessful coups are functions of cred-
ible power-sharing and the strength incumbents are able to display through elections. With a
legislature, a support party or parties and elections to back incumbents, the incentives should
be greater for elites to join the regime instead of attempting to overthrow it.
1.2 Findings
The analysis provides evidence for the proposition that nominally democratic institutions under
authoritarianism contribute to co-optation of potential rivals and deter them from attempting
to overthrow the sitting incumbents. However, I find no evidence that institutional differences
between autocracies with some variant of nominally democratic institutions in place differ in
their propensity to be subjected to a coup attempt. Parties and elections may thus not be
“necessary”. Moreover, the predictive accuracy of coup attempts is improved in both in-sample
and out-of-sample tests when including institutional variables. In addition, three in-depth cases
provide both evidence for and illustrate weaknesses of the theoretical proposition and the me-
thodical approach. Both Stroessner in Paraguay and Ben Ali in Tunisia credibly shared power
through a legislature with parties and legitimized their right to continued rule by “winning” elec-
tions. Finally, the coup performed by the relatively low rank indigenous officer Master Sergeant
Doe in Liberia illustrates that not all coup makers are elites that benefit from nominally demo-
cratic institutions. In other words, although focusing on the relatively homogenous group of
coup attempts more accurately captures the core theoretical argument compared to the diverse
category of regime breakdowns, it is not flawless.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Institutions Under Authoritarianism
Democracy, autocracy, conflict, regime breakdown and coups have been subjected to much
scrutiny by political scientists. Underlining the importance of this research is the Arab uprising
in 2011. The fall of long-lasting dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and the turmoil,
especially in Syria, continues to rattle autocrats in the most undemocratic region of the world.
In addition, the recent coup attempts in Mali, the Maldives and Guinea-Bissau illustrate that
incumbent overthrows still is a prevalent phenomena.
The last large-scale upheaval in autocracies, the third wave, sparked optimism among re-
searchers. During the third wave, scholars noted that a seemingly liberalizing trend was sweep-
ing many repressive regimes, and it was taken as a sign that these regimes were in the process of
transitioning. According to O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), the “liberalization” of
autocracies inherently destabilizes them. Dictablandas and democraduras, liberalized autocracies
and limited democracies, had entered an institutional grey zone and the result would eventually
be “something else”. ‘That something can be the instauration of a political democracy or the
restoration of a new, and possibly more severe, form of authoritarian rule’ (O’Donnell, Schmitter
and Whitehead 1986, 3). Continued chaos, in which nobody manages to consolidate power, can
also ensue. However, the post-Cold War period has shown that the “transitional phase” in many
cases has been never-ending. As explained by Levitsky and Way (2002, 51), ‘the post-Cold War
world has been marked by the proliferation of hybrid political regimes. In different ways, and to
varying degrees, polities ... combined democratic rules with authoritarian governance during the
1990s’. What emerged from many “liberalizing” policies, among them the introduction of nom-
inally democratic institutions, was not democracy, but what has been labeled “hybrid regimes”
(Diamond 2002) or “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002). Indeed, a plethora
of scholars have reported evidence in contrast to the transitionist argument (Brumberg 2002;
Levitsky and Way 2002; Cox 2009; Geddes 2006, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Magaloni
2008, 2010; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Svolik 2010; Wright 2011). In their view, the transitionist
5
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stance, and especially the linear model of democracy, in which “liberalizing” regimes supposedly
head down a slippery slope to democracy, has proved to be severely limited. This is because
“liberalized regimes”, if institutionalized in particular ways, are exceptionally durable. Indeed,
it seems that many autocrats utilize institutions to co-opt potential rivals. More specifically,
nominally democratic institutions can generate incentives for elites to maintain the regime as
opposed to forming rival factions and attempting to overthrow it. As noted by Brumberg (2002,
56), scholars expected that:
the inherently unstable equilibrium of dictablandas would give way to a new equi-
librium of competitive democracy. It is now clear, both within and far beyond the
Middle East, that liberalized autocracy has proven far more durable than once imag-
ined. The trademark mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective
repression in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Algeria, and Kuwait is not just a “survival
strategy” adopted by authoritarian regimes, but rather a type of political system
whose institutions, rules and logic defy any linear model of democratization.
Levitsky and Way (2002, 51) underline the same point by stating that it may be time ‘to stop
thinking of these cases [authoritarian regimes with nominally democratic institutions] in terms of
transitions to democracy and to begin thinking about the specific types of regimes they actually
are’. The rulers of many of these regimes are, however, not only averse to democratization, but
to regime change in general. The aversion indicates that hybrids not necessarily move either in
a nondemocratic or democratic direction, nor do they remain in chaos. In fact, ‘in competitive
authoritarian regimes, formal democratic institutions are widely viewed as the principal means of
obtaining and exercising political authority’ (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52). Certain combinations
of democratic and autocratic characteristics may in fact be more stable than others, as opposed
to the view that nominally democratic institutions in autocracies inherently destabilize them.
Indeed, the expectation of further democratization in “hybrid regimes” may have proved to
be overly optimistic, and this realization sparked much needed attention in institutions under
authoritarianism and their relation to regime longevity. Recently, scholars have started to work
with ‘types’ of authoritarian regimes and propose that each type differs with regard to their
chances of survival, propensities for democratization and the stability of subsequent regimes
(Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010; Cox 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 2006; Gates et al.
2006; Geddes 2006, 2009; Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 2006; Levitsky and Way 2002; Magaloni
and Kricheli 2010; Magaloni 2008, 2010; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Svolik 2010; Wright 2008a,b,
2011; Wright and Escriba-Folch 2012). The focus on types of authoritarian regimes is fruitful,
because in the same manner as democracies differ:
so do contemporary authoritarian regimes, and if we are to understand the contempo-
rary dynamics, causes, limits, and possibilities of regime change (including possible
future democratization), we must understand the different, and in some respects
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new, types of authoritarian rule (Diamond 2002, 33).
Overall, the common perceptions are that monarchies, one-party and hegemonic states are ex-
ceptionally stable, while military and especially non-dominant multiple party regimes are more
prone to breakdown. For instance, Hadenius and Teorell (2006, 146) find that monarchies,
‘regimes in which a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in ac-
cordance with accepted practice or the constitution’, is the type of autocracy with the longest
average life span. On the other hand, electoral autocracies in which the incumbent party is non-
dominant have the shortest average life span and most often transition into democracies. More-
over, in his analysis of the perils of presidentialism, Cheibub (2007) concludes that democracies
following military dictatorships are more brittle than democracies following civilian authoritar-
ian regimes. Thus, he argues that the reason presidential democracies break down more often
than parliamentary democracies is that presidentialism, as a result of historical coincidence, tend
to follow military dictatorships. He goes on to argue that there exists a military-presidential
nexus, reflecting ‘that military dictatorships appeared, remained, and/or recurred – in other
words, endured – in countries that had adopted presidential institutions’ (Cheibub 2007, 153-
154). Furthermore, Gates et al. (2006, 893) state, in accordance with the transitionists, that
‘both democratic and autocratic stability depend on self-enforcing equilibria, such that the main-
tenance of a polity’s institutional structure is in the interest of political officials, whether through
autocratic or democratic control’. Inconsistent regimes, which exhibit a blend of autocratic and
democratic features, lack the self-enforcing equilibria of consistent democracies and autocracies,
and will therefore either be pushed in the direction of a more purely autocratic or democratic
polity, or simply remain in a continued circle of regime breakdowns.
I side with Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009, 404) in that ‘broad-stroke distinctions’ may oversim-
plify the true patterns by disregarding the institutional heterogeneity of authoritarian regimes
and its relation to regime stability. For instance, what is the specific institutional structure
of an inconsistent regime, apart from the fact that it is not sufficiently constrained or free?
Intuitively, one might interpret “inconsistent” to mean autocracies with nominally democratic
institutions. However, the classification offers no explanation as to what the exact nature of
the institutional design of the inconsistent regimes is. Another example of oversimplification is
the label of “military regimes”. First, scholars disagree on what a military regime is, and the
definitions are often unclear. This imprecision leads to more subjective classifications of regimes.
Hadenius and Teorell (2006, 146) follow Nordlinger (1977) and define military autocracies as
‘states “in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their
actual or threatened use of force”’. Cheibub (2007, 162) on the other hand, classify all regimes
in which the head of state currently is or have been a part of the state military prior to assuming
power as military regimes. Indeed, ‘even if he retired from service, shedding the uniform does
not eliminate his military status’. These two definitions result in a large number of discrepan-
cies when classifying regimes. In fact, 33 % of all military regimes by the latter standard are
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classified as other regimes by the former, such as limited multi-party or one party autocracies.
For instance, was Mubarak’s Egypt a military regime, a multi-party regime or perhaps both?
What about Ben Ali’s Tunisia or Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s rule in Nicaragua? Second, if
military regimes are relatively brittle, then what explains the longevity of present-day Myanmar
or Pinochet’s Chile? I argue that by focusing on objectively and easily observed institutional
differences, we might be able to expose the reasons for discrepancies in stability in a manner
that expansive, unclear and more subjective regime typologies may not.
Although findings in the literature diverge, the examples of Hadenius and Teorell (2006),
Cheibub (2007) and Gates et al. (2006) illustrate that the stability of autocracies, the stabil-
ity of succeeding regimes and the propensity for democratization is influenced by institutional
organization, and that specificity is needed to understand the mechanisms behind the observed
patterns. Moreover, these three examples obliterate a common notion of the past, expressly that
institutions in nondemocracies are nothing but “window dressing”(e.g. Friedrich and Brzezinski
in Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1292). Such an argument implies both that institutions are
not determined by any conditions under which they emerged, and that they do not influence
conditions. In other words, neither do institutions play a mediating role in affecting outcomes,
nor do they directly affect outcomes. If autocrats randomly dressed their windows, then no pat-
terns would be found. In the next sections, I elaborate upon how certain institutions, namely
legislatures, parties and elections can prolong autocratic rule.
2.2 Institutions Under Authoritarianism and Coup Attempts
How, specifically, are nominally democratic institutions expected to affect the risk of coup at-
tempts in authoritarian regimes? In short, it is hypothesized that autocrats utilize support
parties, elections and legislatures to co-opt potential rivals by sharing power and spoils, gather
information about the opposition and credibly reinforce the perception of their right to con-
tinued rule (Cox 2009; Geddes 2006, 2009; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Magaloni 2008, 2010;
Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Svolik 2010; Wright 2011). The core
of the argument is that these institutions compel potential rivals to invest in the regime, and
thereby reduce the risk that these rivals engage in rebellion. I turn my attention to intra-regime
power battles and inspect the effect of the existence of regime support parties, elections and
legislatures on coup attempts by focusing on two intertwined arguments for why institutions
in authoritarian regimes may help deter elites from attempting to overthrow the incumbent.
First, it is crucial to establish a credible power-sharing relationship with potential rivals. The
incumbents are expected to concede power to an assembly of regime elites, most commonly
through the active use of a legislative body and/or a regime support party. Second, elections in
which incumbents display strength are expected to prolong autocratic survival by legitimizing
the rulers’ continued right to rule and portray an image of invincibility. This invincibility in
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turn deters the elite from attempting to overthrow the incumbent and compel them to invest in
the regime.
The next section turns to an elaboration of the argument of credible power-sharing.
2.2.1 Credibly Sharing Power: a Legislature and a Support Party Platform
The theory of credible power-sharing in relation to authoritarian longevity and, by extension,
the occurrence of coup attempts concerns two main groups of possible perpetrators. The first
group of potential perpetrators are civilian elites, and the second group is the military. Au-
thoritarian incumbents must commit to a power-sharing relationship with both groups of actors
in order to secure themselves against possible attempts at overthrowing them. The reason is
that their cooperation is likely to successfully bring down the incumbents in a coup. Primarily,
co-opting non-military elites is vital because many coups, although carried out by military or
para-military forces, are orchestrated by civilians. Accordingly, the complete military’s support
for the regime is of obvious importance. Although, as explained by Geddes (2009, 7), coups
have been carried out by only a few people; ‘at the extreme, the government of Liberia was
overthrown in 1980 by 17 men led by a sergeant [and] ... many coups have been carried out with
only a few hundred troops’, most coups fail without a relatively unison military force backing it.
For instance, the failed coup attempt in Senegal in 1962 was largely due to the fact that coup-
plotter Mamadou Dia only had sporadic support by the military forces (Powell and Thyne 2011).
Establishing a credible power-sharing relationship with both non-military and military elites
is mainly done through the successful use of a support party and/or legislatures. As Boix
and Svolik (2010, 29-30) acknowledges, ‘some institutions in dictatorships – such as parties,
legislatures, or ruling councils - alleviate commitment and monitoring problems caused by the
secrecy in authoritarian governance and thereby lead to more stable ruling coalitions’, in fact,
dictators who institutionalize ‘are less likely to lose office violently’. In other words, following the
logic posed by Gates et al. (2006), autocracies that are structured in ways that compel potential
rivals to work in the interest of the regime, rather than rebelling against it, will be more stable
than other autocratic regimes. Magaloni (2008, 1) reaches the same conclusion, when she argues
that ‘if dictators cannot commit to not abusing their “loyal friends” – those who choose to invest
in the existing autocratic institutions rather than in forming subversive coalitions – they will be
in permanent danger of being overthrown, both by members of the ruling elite and by outside
rivals’. The underlying assumption for the following arguments is that authoritarian rulers are
interested in prolonging their stay in power (see e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Magaloni
and Kricheli 2010; Magaloni 2008). This means that the existence or establishment of seemingly
democratic institutions in autocracies is a way of securing their stay in office, not, in the lingo
of transitionists, a process of actual liberalization (Brumberg 2002; Levitsky and Way 2002).
Institutionalizing is important, considering that the alternative to co-opting and bargain-
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ing with elites is oftentimes severe repression. Violent autocrats endanger their position as
rulers because ‘if autocrats rely too much on terror, repression, and intimidation to sustain their
rule, they become more vulnerable to agency and moral-hazard problems on the part of their
own security apparatus, upon which their ability to survive ultimately depends’ (Magaloni and
Kricheli 2010, 126). The sole dependence upon military repression then, exposes the regime to
two threats. First, the threat of the military refusing to carry out the violent missions assigned
to them, and secondly, for civilian elites – who have nothing to lose because of their marginal-
ization – to conspire against the violent regime incumbents with the support of disillusioned
military leaders. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007, 1281) underline the same point in that ‘auto-
crats may certainly use force to impose cooperation and to eliminate threats of rebellion. But
the use of force is costly and may not always be effective ... As a result, the ruler may find it
useful to rely on other strategies to elicit cooperation and avert rebellion’. This is because even
though a limited number of ostensible threats in society may be silenced by repression, it is not
likely that more subtle and complex possible threat groups are effectively deterred by violence,
such as the bureaucracy or the universities. In line with Magaloni’s argument, it is likely that
the military will agree to limited repression, but not killing of the embittered masses. A recent
example of how the military turned their backs on the incumbent is Mubarak’s downfall in Egypt
in 2011. When ordered to strike down the upheaval at any cost, the military refused and took
the protesters’ side, effectively removing one of the longest-sitting autocrats from power. At the
same time, Mubarak’s 30-year long rule is an excellent example of how institutions can enhance
the longevity of nondemocracies, as the regime held elections and allowed multiple parties in
the legislature, thereby effectively usurping potential regime rivals. The Egypt example also
introduces a limiting aspect of the credible power-sharing strategy: even though institutions
may prolong autocrats’ stay in office, the strategy is not impervious. The link between insti-
tutionalizing and survival is mainly related to elite challengers, not necessarily mass protests.
The moment there is a mass uprising, as the ones observed in Egypt, Libya and Yemen and
the current one in Syria, proper institutions are helpless in detaining the protesters, who likely
do not gain much from the existence of parties, legislatures or elections. In this text, I solely
concentrate on the threat against the ruling clique that emerges from within the state apparatus.
Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) claim that potential rivals can be co-opted by being offered
a seat in the legislative body and thereby have a say in the regime’s policy-making and access
to economic benefits. This broadens the basis of support for the incumbent to include the
polity’s most influential people, who are also the most likely rivals. An autocrat’s survival in
office, just like politicians’ in democracies, is likely to depend on ‘the ability to navigate among
various political forces and to build coalitions’ (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1280). They
find that seemingly democratic institutions exist for systematic reasons. Of particular interest
to the research question, monarchs and military leaders are less likely to rely upon nominally
democratic institutions because they can rely upon already existing connections, namely family
2.2. INSTITUTIONS UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM AND COUP ATTEMPTS 11
ties and the military. Civilian dictators, however, must create a platform to secure their stay
in power, and they are likely to depend upon a regime support party and legislatures in order
to do so. As noted earlier, Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) do not investigate whether military
rulers or monarchs who depend on both nominally democratic institutions and their military
foes are more stable than those who merely rely upon non-civilian connections. However, the
observation that ‘overinstitutionalizing does appear to provide some benefits for rulers’, in that
they on average survive longer in power than those who, in their terminology, only “optimally
institutionalize” may indicate such a pattern (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, 1290). In this
case, “overinstitutionalizing”, although not defined, can be interpreted to mean the existence of
legislatures, a regime party or parties in monarchies or military regimes.
Magaloni (2008) builds upon and criticizes Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) in two manners.
First, by introducing the concept of trust. She argues that since autocrats are not constrained
by institutions in the same way as democratic incumbents, the existence of these institutions will
not provide a rival with security that policy demands will be respected. According to Gandhi and
Przeworski, a legislative seat is a valuable power base. However, due to the relative autonomy
of the executive power in autocracies, ‘policy-making power cannot be credibly granted through
legislative seats per se’ (Magaloni 2008, 5). This contention is supported by Geddes (2006,
9), who stresses that ‘in many authoritarian regimes legislatures have little if any influence on
policy’. According to this view, the only way for incumbents to credibly promise influence is
to give up ‘absolute power to select members of the ruling coalition into positions of power by
delegating this authority to the ruling party’ (Magaloni 2008, 9). If legislative offices, government
positions and prospects of advancements are ‘guaranteed’ for elites through a regime-friendly
party membership, this will help facilitate credibility of offices offered or held. As explained by
Magaloni (2008, 2):
By giving up his absolute powers to select members of the ruling clique into gov-
ernment positions, the dictator can more credibly guarantee a share of power and
the spoils of office over the long run to those who invest in the existing institutions
rather than in subversive coalitions. The credibility of the power-sharing deal cru-
cially depends on the party’s ability to effectively control access to political positions
and on the fact that the party can be expected to last into the future. A dictator
will possess an interest to uphold a system of credible power-sharing with his ruling
clique to make his life less vulnerable to conspiracies, military coups, and violent
rebellions.
Put differently, the mere existence of a legislature may not be sufficient. A platform where
the regime supporters are granted some, if limited, power in relation to the incumbents will
solidify their commitment to the regime. According to Magaloni (2008), Boix and Svolik (2010)
and Geddes (2006), the regime party is the most common platform to fill the power-sharing
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void. However, it is not made sufficiently clear why regime supporters in a legislature without
parties cannot credibly be granted the same powers, and hence validates inspecting the effect
of a legislature independent of the existence of parties. This inspection is further warranted by
the admission that there is risk associated with the existence of parties. Specifically, through
leading a support party, officials may become influential and well-organized figures and decide to
attempt an overthrow of the current top power holders. This was the case in the Nasser’s ouster
of Naguib in Egypt in 1954. Two years after jointly bringing down the monarchy lead by Faruq
I, Nasser, trusted leader of the official party, the Revolutionary Command Council, managed
to oust the sitting Naguib (for details, see Geddes 2006). This is part of the ruling clique’s
dilemma, to risk launching a powerful rival by allowing a strong support party, or to rule with a
more narrow platform. Also, for similar reasons, there are several liabilities involved in allowing
more than one party. Potentially, this is essentially allowing multiple possible launching pads
for rivals risking that the number of powerful elites multiplies. In addition, opening for multiple
parties increases the likelihood that one or more of these parties are independent of the regime.
Secondly, both Magaloni (2008) and Geddes (2006) underline that institutionalizing is not
primarily a tool for deterring the masses, but for co-optation of possible elite rivals. Although
one of the functions of being a party official is to convince the masses of its supremacy, ‘many au-
thoritarian parties have disappointed their creators precisely because they have failed to deliver
benefits to citizens and thus build support for the regime. Party officials, rather than linking
the masses to the center via the exchange of benefits for support, have instead used party offices
to enrich themselves, thus alienating citizens from the party that claims to serve their interests’
(Geddes 2006, 9). However, even though party representatives may estrange citizens, they are
believed to enhance the tenure of autocrats. This is due to the general consensus that the most
serious threats to regime stability are not posed by the masses, but by regime allies, who in
turn then are the main targets of co-optation through the benefits of their membership in the
support party. As explained above, in order to account for the emphasis on elite co-optation and
deterrence, my contention is that testing the theoretical framework by inspecting coup attempts
is more accurate, because the degree of elite involvement in regime breakdowns vary greatly.
By offering potential rivals a progressive route to more influence, increased spoils and sub-
sequently having the chance of running for office through party membership then, rivals are
tempted to invest their time in the regime rather than plotting coups. The general idea is that
the higher in the hierarchy a potential rival moves, the more invested and less likely he or she is
to attempt to overthrow the incumbents. This contention is affirmed by Gandhi and Przeworski
(2006, 1283) when they conclude that ‘the party offers individuals willing to collaborate with
the regime a vehicle for advancing their careers within a stable system of patronage’. In some
regimes this effect is amplified by the fact that the highest office is accessible without having to
resort to a coup, as is common in communist regimes. It is clear that by easing the problems of
commitment, the existence of a legislature and a support party or parties, should decrease the
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chances of a coup attempt. Hence, the hypotheses become:
H1: Autocracies with a legislature are less likely to be subjected to a coup attempt.
H2: Autocracies allowing a legislature with at least one party are less likely to be subjected
to a coup attempt.
Hypothesis 2 implies that the effect of one party and multiple parties in the legislature is the
same. However, if allowing parties is potentially hazardous, then it is possible that more parties
complicates the effects of credible power-sharing, especially if one of the additional parties in the
legislature is independent of the regime. In other words, the effect may differ between autocra-
cies with one party in the legislature and multiple party autocracies. I therefore disaggregate
H2 into two parts:
H2a: Autocracies allowing a legislature with one party are less likely to be subjected to a
coup attempt.
H2b: Autocracies allowing a legislature with more than one party are less likely to be sub-
jected to a coup attempt.
Moreover, the claim is not only that autocrats relying on parties are less prone to coup at-
tempts, but also that ‘the creation of a support party increases the risk that a coup attempt will
fail because such parties increase the number of citizens who have something to lose from the
ouster of the dictator and build some degree of organizational structure through which citizens
can be mobilized into streets protests if needed’ (Geddes 2006, 11). In other words, the poten-
tial loss of spoils and opportunities suffered by co-opted civilian or military regime elites in the
aftermath of a successful coup motivates them to intervene on behalf of the sitting incumbents
in the event of an attempt. Hence, I hypothesize that:
H3: Autocracies with nominally democratic institutions are less likely to be overthrown when
subjected to a coup attempt.
2.2.2 Credibly Reinforcing the Right to Continued Rule: Elections
As explained above, a credible power-sharing relationship between the ruling clique and elites
may be the reason for a link between a support party or parties, regime survival and, by con-
sequence, attempts at overthrowing the incumbent. Magaloni (2008) exemplifies the stabilizing
effects of credible power-sharing by referring to monarchies who pass the throne on to relatives,
and effectively entice family members to invest in the regime because of a promise of increased
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benefits down the road. In Saudi-Arabia, the throne is not handed from father to son, but from
brother to brother, thereby including more family members in a credible power-sharing rela-
tionship. In non-monarchic autocracies however, parties serve a similar function by providing
members a route to power. For instance, the PRI’s almost 70-year long rule included numerous
changes in leadership proving that party autocracies can handle leadership succession. From
1946 until the regime fell in 2000, the Mexican regime changed ruler every sixth year. Under-
lining that even though Mexico’s institutional structure was exceptional, leadership succession
in party-reliant autocracies is not. In fact, according to Magaloni (2008, 10–11):
‘most party dictatorships have been able to handle leadership succession. This is
not only true for communist dictatorships in China, the USSR, and most of Eastern
Europe, but also for a large number of cases in Africa and Asia, where dictatorial
political parties have been able to pass power, at least once but sometimes more
times, to a successor following the deaths or retirements of their founding dictators’.
The Soviet Union had 9 different leaders during its almost 70-year existence. Similarly, the
Botswanan ruling party BDP has survived four leadership changes since 1966.
It is crucial to note, however, that the existence of a legislature and a support party or parties
may not be sufficient to deter elites from coup attempts. The commonality between the Mexican
PRI prior to 2000, the Soviet Communist Party and the BDP is their monopoly on power
positions. In other words, the regime party’s actual strength might be equally important, both in
terms of electoral support and legislative seats. The reasoning for this is fairly straightforward.
If regime elites suspect that the sitting incumbent is weak, in terms of legislative seats, or
unpopular, in terms of share of votes, they will be inclined to attempt an overthrow of the
regime rather than support it. This argument is related to whether or not elites can expect
the regime to last. A ruling clique without the support of the elite, or whose fate rests in the
hands of the elite, cannot guarantee longevity. Projecting that the incumbent is invincible on a
regular basis is likely to deter an attempt at overthrowing the sitting executive. As underlined
by Magaloni (2008, 10):
As long as the autocratic party holds the monopoly of power positions and remains
the ‘only game in town’, there will be strong incentives for the rank-and-file to join
the ruling party, perform their services, and remain loyal over the long run.
Indeed, as important as a legislature and support party or parties are believed to be, certain
conditions may need to be met in order for incumbents to reap the benefits. Accepting the
importance of remaining the only game in town, we would expect that regimes in which the
support party win elections by a landslide, and hence controls the majority of legislative seats
are unlikely to be subjected to coup attempts.
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The importance of displaying strength through elections is both connected to the information
elections provide incumbents and the signaling effect it has on potential regime opposition.
The line of reasoning, closely connected with credible power-sharing, is explained succinctly by
Wright (2011, 9–10):
... winning elections by large margins signals incumbent party strength. Large vic-
tory margins provide common information to elites that the probability of electoral
victory outside the incumbent party is low. Parties that can demonstrate electoral
dominance thus deter investment in the opposition, both among activists and partic-
ularly elites. In the face of an invincible party, elites will not defect to the opposition.
In other words, displaying strength through elections signals to potential rivals that joining the
regime is wise as opposed to attempting to overthrow it. Being part of a support party that is
seemingly invincible and in which spoils and regime positions are divided between members is
a lot more compelling than taking the risk of attempting to overthrow it. Additionally, being a
part of the regime elite is an effective strategy, not only in order to progressively claim higher
positions and reap economic benefits as time passes, but also to observe whether the support
party platform fades in the future, and a potentially successful coup is more likely. Not joining
will certainly deprive a potential rival of the former, and most likely the latter possibility as
well, since regime elites are more informed about the regime’s coherence. I am not suggesting
that elections under authoritarianism are free and fair in the democratic sense, but that they
nonetheless help shape the perception of the incumbent’s staying power. Wright (2011) finds
evidence for electoral spending cycles in authoritarian regimes, suggesting that autocrats make
an effort to buy political support and display their dominance on the political arena. As an
example, the Mexican PRI was renowned for their grand electoral campaigns throughout their
70-year long uninterrupted rule in which they promoted their ‘presidential’ candidates. The
recent development in Russia, where support for Putin is declining for the first time since he
entered national politics, may be attributed to the complete lack of an electoral campaign and the
United Russia party’s arrogance regarding their supreme position in Russian politics. Moreover,
elections might, as suggested by Collier and Hoeﬄer (2005, 8-9) legitimize the government
because its power is founded upon ‘means that society accepts’. Indeed, an elected autocrat, no
matter how flawed the election process, is likely to be considered more legitimate than a recent
coup maker.
Lastly, elections are thought to provide the regime with valuable information about popu-
lar support and popular opposition candidates. Through elections, the potential threats can
be identified and silenced or co-opted before they become too powerful. Additionally, the in-
formation revealed through elections is important for both the incumbent and the elites when
bargaining for spoils and influence. Cox (2009) claims that incumbents hold elections in order
to increase their bargaining position vis-a´-vis opposition elites. The breakdown of a bargain
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increases the likelihood that opposition elites will attempt to overthrow the regime. However,
a regime that can display their staying power and seem invincible is less likely to be opposed
in spite of bargain breakdowns because the ruling clique has demonstrated their dominance.
In line with Geddes (1999) and Hadenius and Teorell (2006) the threshold for invincibility (or
dominance) is set to 67 % of the legislative seats in regimes that hold elections. Hence, the
hypotheses becomes:
H4: Autocrats that display strength through elections are less likely to be subjected to a
coup attempt.
By the same logic as explained regarding Hypothesis 2, I further distinguish between autocracies
with one party in the legislature and multiple party autocracies to check for possibly asymmetric
effects. Due to the fact that most regimes allowing only one party in the legislature arrange
elections, Hypothesis 2a picks up near the exact same information as the equivalent disaggrega-
tion of Hypothesis 3. This implies the introduction of one new hypothesis:
H4b: Multiple party autocracies in which incumbents win elections by a landslide are less
likely to be subjected to a coup attempt.
2.2.3 Coup Makers and the Creation of a Support Party Platform
In order to fully comprehend both the advantages and limitations of elections, a support
party/parties and a legislature it is vital to consider the risks and consequences of a coup
attempt. As stated by Geddes (2006, 13):
Coups are always risky. Plots can be infiltrated by the secret service and plotters
arrested. Communication and coordination are big problems for conspirators, and
many attempted military uprisings have failed either because one garrison has risen
too early, giving the government warning and a chance to defeat the uprising peace-
meal, or because parts of the military expected to join and control key installations,
roads or bridges, fail to get the signal to begin operations. Unpredictable accidents
occur. Coup leaders can be killed in plane crashes while returning from exile.
What then, are the consequences of a coup attempt for both the perpetrators and the targets?
First, in addition to the fact that coups always are risky, the institutionalization of autocratic
rule and demonstration of mass support is assumed to influence risk in two ways, (i) reduce the
chances of a coup attempt and (ii) decrease the chances of being overthrown in a coup.
Second, and perhaps most importantly to incumbents, regime supporters and coup makers,
a coup attempt is a manifestation of separation in the ruling factions that will have severe
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consequences both if the coup makers are detained or successful. In fact, ‘the whole regime
is weakened by this display of disunity, regardless of which side wins’ (Geddes 2006, 12). In
other words, for the incumbents, the reduction of the chances that a coup is successful is not
satisfactory, because the crucial picture of the invincible regime will diminish even in the face of
unsuccessful attempts, no matter how many of its former supporters rebelled. When the curtain
drops, the chances of further rebellion might skyrocket – possibly leading to subsequent coup
attempts, mass upheaval or even civil war. If successful, the power relations are unclear and the
stabilizing effect of credible power-sharing is compromised or gone. The uncertainty regarding
the future will likely spark uneasiness and lead to factionalization within the former regime elite.
New relations must be established and trust re-established. Additionally, as underlined by Collier
and Hoeﬄer (2005, 8-9), ‘the type of government with the least claim to legitimacy is evidently
one that has itself recently come to power through a coup’. Coup makers’ governments have not
come to power through semi-legitimate means, as can be claimed by autocrats arranging unfair,
counterfeit elections or ruling cliques that have been legitimized through tradition, such as in
China or North Korea. Indeed, narrating a story of legitimacy is a problem for coup makers,
since a coup is inherently illegitimate. The implications of this line of reasoning are that coup
attempts should breed additional coup attempts and that coup-initiated autocracies should be
more likely to be subjected to future coup attempts, especially in the immediate aftermath of
the seizure of power. Indeed, there exists a “coup trap” (Londregan and Poole 1990; Collier and
Hoeﬄer 2005). This expectation is further strengthened by the findings of Goemans, Gleditsch
and Chiozza (2009, 10-11), namely that:
‘leader-specific characteristics beyond time in office – such as the manner in which
leaders attain office, or the number of their previous spells in office – has a strong
influence on subsequent events and behavior. For example, a leader who came to
power irregularly is over three times more likely to lose power in an irregular manner.
The discussion above leads me to the following hypotheses:
H5: Coup-initiated autocracies are more likely to be subjected to coup attempts.
Why are coup-initiated autocracies interesting beyond being a control variable? I follow Ged-
des (2009) and argue that if coup-initiated autocracies are more likely to be subjected to coup
attempts, then, in accordance with the arguments of credible power-sharing, the creation of a
regime support party platform in the national legislature should decrease the risk of coup at-
tempts in these regimes. Put differently, coup makers who establish an arena for credible power
sharing after coming to power, effectively co-opt potential rivals and broaden the base of the
regime. A regime party acts as a vehicle to lower the incentives for counter-coups by establishing
trust, sharing spoils and enables the possibility of promotions as outlined above. For example,
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one year after Hafez al-Assad came to power in Syria, he established the Arab Socialist Ba’ath
Party in a national legislature to represent the new clique of power holders. His son, Bashar
al-Assad, still rules in Syria with the continued support of the Ba’ath Party. Moreover, the
party should represent a clean break with the former rulers. This helps in narrating a story of
legitimacy for the coup makers, as it delegitimizes the previous ruling clique and simultaneously
brings an alternative to the table. Additionally, in already existing parties there is likely to exist
opposition, especially if the party was governing before the coup. Thus, relying upon existing
parties is less effective for coup makers. Stated as a testable hypothesis this becomes:
H6: Coup-initiated autocracies in which incumbents create a support party platform in the
legislature are less likely to be subjected to coup attempts than incumbents in coup-initiated
autocracies that do not allow parties or rely upon already existing parties.
Next, I turn to an elaboration on the research design.
Chapter 3
Research Design
Below, I develop a quantitative research design in order to test the proposition that nominally
democratic institutions in autocracies are instrumental in deterring regime elites from attempting
to overthrow the ruling clique, and that coup makers are often themselves couped. First, I discuss
the sources of the data and why country years is an appropriate unit of analysis. Second, a
range of operationalizations of the concepts discussed above is presented. Third, a set of control
variables drawn from earlier research on coups and regime change will be introduced to evaluate
the real effect of the institutional design of autocracies on coup attempts. Fourth, I discuss
possible omitted variable bias. Finally, I present the statistical model.
3.1 Dataset and Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis is autocratic country years, meaning that democracies are excluded from
the core analysis. There are two main reasons for the choice to analyze only autocracies, one
theoretical and one methodological. The theoretical reason is simple: I am interested in modeling
differences between autocracies. The methodological argument is inspired by Achen (2005) and
Schrodt (2010). To focus on autocracies only is consistent with the idea of separating the
observations into a meaningful subset coherently reflecting the theoretical framework. Thus,
instead of estimating large and overly complicated models as a result of the analysis being
performed on unnecessarily heterogenous observations, all models are as minimalistic as possible.
This makes interpretation of the estimates easier and avoids so-called “garbage-can” regressions.
As explained by Achen (2005, 337), ever so often in statistical modeling ‘the result is a long list
of independent variables, a jumbled bag of nearly unrelated observations, and often a hopelessly
bad specification with meaningless (but statistically significant with many asterisks!) results’.
Admittedly, a minimalistic approach opens for the possibility of omitted variable bias. As a
remedy, I perform a series of robustness tests to make sure that the results of my core models
are not affected by my approach.
This leaves a dataset consisting of 4396 observations with 267 coup attempts of which 138
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are successful. Every country year runs from January 1st–December 31st from 1950, the es-
tablishment or independence of the country until it ceases to exist, or until 2008. Events that
happen in year y are recorded as changes in year y+1. For example, if regime x breaks down at
any date in 1950, the newly-established regime z is coded from January 1st in 1951. Although it
would certainly be preferable to analyze country days, mainly because some countries experience
multiple coup attempts in the same year, accurately dated information on institutional change
regarding legislatures, parties and elections is not currently available and would require coding
and data compilation that is well beyond the scope of this thesis. In order to deal with the
problem of multiple coup attempts in one country year, I have coded as follows: one coup if
there were multiple coups in a country year; and one coup if there were one successful coup and
one unsuccessful coup attempt in a country year.12 Moreover, country years is the prevalent
unit of analysis in the democratization literature and a viable one for the obvious reason that I
am looking to explain attempts at overthrowing country specific governments.
The data set has been compiled from a number of frequently used and reliable data. The coup
data provided by Powell and Thyne (2011) are heavily based on previously released information
and accepted rules for distinguishing coup attempts from other attempts at overthrowing the
incumbent. Moreover, the data on institutions, nature of regimes and economic development
has been gathered from Przeworski et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), Cheibub, Gandhi and
Vreeland (2010), Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers (2010), Vanhanen (2000), Maddison (2006) and
Teorell et al. (2011). All sources are common in the democratization literature. The data from
Vanhanen (2000) has been extended until 2008 to enhance the temporal coverage.
Missing data issues are virtually non-existent. There are no missing data points in the
updated dataset for institutions (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010), and all other data sources
cover almost all countries in the world with populations above 500,000. A notable exception is
Zimbabwe, which has missing values on the first 15 years of the country’s existence. In all of
the 15 years missing, Zimbabwe was an institutionalized autocracy, and was not subjected to
any coup attempts. However, missing only 15 observations out of almost 4400 total should not
affect the results.
3.2 Operationalizing Elusive Concepts
Operationalizing the theoretical concepts introduced in the previous chapter in order to empir-
ically test them in a quantitative model is a hazardous task. The abstract nature of the most
central concepts inherent to the theoretical framework is undoubtedly one of the key reasons for
the diverging results and prevalent confusion in the democratization and conflict literature. I
1These observations are listed in Appendix 1.
2An implication may be that results are more conservative than they would have been with more accurate
data.
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will attempt to secure the robustness and transparency of my results in several manners. First,
the regime type classifications will solely be coded using easily observable, transparent criteria,
and lastly, based on a simple aggregation method as advised by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland
(2010). Second, a number of alternative operationalizations of the concepts, statistical tests
and model specifications will be employed to ensure the validity and robustness of the findings.
Third, in the next section I discuss possible selection problems related to the dependent vari-
able. Finally, all variables included in the analysis are either directly linked to the theoretical
argument and concepts, or included because of their predictive power in earlier research on coup
attempts and democratization.
Next, I turn to the operationalization of my dependent variables: coup attempts and suc-
cessful coups.
3.2.1 Unravelling the Coup d‘E´tat: Targets, Perpetrators, Tactics, Rumors,
Success and Failure
As mentioned in the introduction, throughout the thesis, successful overthrows of the incumbent
are referred to as coups, while unsuccessful endeavors are labeled unsuccessful coup attempts.
Additionally, a coup attempt ‘includes illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites
within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive’, whether successful or not (Powell
and Thyne 2011, 252).
I utilize Powell and Thyne’s data for coup attempts, which emerges from a discussion of
various aspects of coups that analysts have previously used to decode the phenomenon. They
review five criteria in order to identify all valid coup attempts from 1950-2010. First and
foremost, the target must be the chief executive. Second, the perpetrators may be ‘any elite
who is part of the state apparatus. These can include non-civilian members of the military and
security services, or civilian members of government’ (Powell and Thyne 2011, 250-251). The
emphasis on elite perpetrators is, as underlined above, related to the core contribution of this
thesis. This criterion avoids conflating coups with events such as civil wars, revolutions, popular
movements, foreign interventions, democratization or institutional changes, all of which can,
but need not, be orchestrated by elite actors. Thus, focusing on coup attempts more accurately
captures the argument of elite co-optation. Third, to differentiate coups from political pressure,
outbreaks of violence or even civil war, the tactics must be of illegal nature, but need not involve
bloodshed. Fourth, there must be an actual and overt attempt at seizing power. This aspect
is closely related to failed coups, as the identification of failed attempts to seize power is not
always as clear cut as the identification of successful ones. To pinpoint a change in the executive
office as a consequence of illegal activity is normally unproblematic. In the opposite case, one is
often left with plots and rumors. Therefore, coup attempts must be overt, meaning that there
was a visible movement to claim power, and actual in the sense that the event is not claimed ex
post (for instance in order to persecute someone). Fifth, unrelated to the definition of a coup
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per se, a distinction is made between successful and unsuccessful coups. All coups in which the
coup makers hold onto power for 7 days or more are coded as successful.
To summarize, a coup occurred if the chief executive was overtly and illegally overthrown
by any elite who is part of the state apparatus. A failed attempt was made if criteria 1-4 are
met, but the chief executive managed to stay in power. In the main models and robustness tests
then, I arrive at two dichotomous dependent variables identifying:
- Coup attempts.
- Successful coups only.
There is one notable problem with the operationalization of coup attempts described above.
As already mentioned, it is unclear whether all unsuccessful coups can be positively identified
due to uncertainty surrounding the events and possible rumors leaked by the ruling clique or
the opposition in order to achieve a political goal. Also, language concerns restrain Powell and
Thyne (2011) to major news sources that likely do not throughly cover as detailed information
as more local news sources. This is especially true for time distant events. The same logic can
be applied to successful coups. They are not necessarily as easily observed as proposed by the
authors. Since many major decisions are taken in the inner sanctums of the regime, a lot of
secrecy and uncertainty revolves around these decisions and the true course of events. Another
reason to expect that some coups might not escape the inner circles of the regime is that the
problem of secrecy is not constricted to autocracies. Although the norm is transparency, it is
sometimes difficult determining the dynamics of intra-party politics in democracies, especially
in cases surrounded by controversy. These potential drawbacks of the data quality may lead
to biased results since it is possible that many more coup attempts than reported by the data
have been performed. Moreover, it is impossible to know whether coup attempts are more
easily observed in regimes with nominally democratic institutions or not. Intuitively, it would
seem that coup attempts in regimes with a more narrow power base would be harder to “spot”.
However, transparency and institutions may not be interlinked, exemplified by the closed nature
of North Korea. In North Korea, there exists a legislature, a party and elections are arranged,
but information about events for outsiders is severely constrained nonetheless. Aware of these
potential caveats, I accept that there is little I can do to redeem the possible drawbacks of the
data beyond recognizing them and be mindful when making inferences.
How do we know what the nature of a regime is? The next sections turns to a discussion on
how to operationally identify autocracies, and the regimes relevant to the hypotheses.
3.2.2 Identifying Autocracies
The defining traits of democracies and autocracies are much debated by scholars of democrati-
zation. In most cases, autocracy is defined as not a democracy. For instance, as explained by
Bobbio (1989, 134), ‘the term “democracy” has always been used to designate one of the forms
of government, or rather one of the ways in which political power can be exercised. Specifically,
3.2. OPERATIONALIZING ELUSIVE CONCEPTS 23
it designates that form of government in which political power is exercised by the people’. In this
example, an autocracy is a form of government in which political power is not exercised by the
people. Recent research has shown that this crude approach has severe shortcomings. Although
it is certainly true that all regimes that are not democracies, are nondemocracies, treating all of
these regimes as one group may have masked important differences between them in relation to
duration, economic performance and hence, perhaps the occurrence of coup attempts. However,
before distinguishing between different kinds of autocracies, it is vital to differentiate them from
democracies.
I utilize the autocracy-democracy dichotomy first introduced in Przeworski et al. (1996) that
provides a procedural, minimalist conception of democracy (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland
2010). In line with Cheibub (2007, 26-27), I argue that it ‘is superior on several grounds – most
importantly that it provides a nonarbitrary and entirely reproducible way of distinguishing
democracies from dictatorships’.3 Indeed, it is based on clear-cut rules for the presence of
certain institutions for classifying regimes. As explained by Przeworski et al. (1996, 4):
Democracy, for us, is thus a regime in which some governmental offices are filled
as a consequence of contested elections. This definition has two parts: ‘offices’ and
‘contestation’ ... What is essential to consider a regime as democratic is that two
kinds of offices are filled, directly or indirectly, by elections – the chief executive
office and the seats in the effective legislative body – and that the office holders are
responsible only to the electors, not to any non-elected powers.
An autocracy then, is any regime not fulfilling these criteria. In other words, either gov-
ernmental offices are not filled through elections, or these elections do not meet the criteria of
contestation, meaning that all citizens have the right to run for office or vote for any candidate
they like.
Contestation is decided by three features. First, ex ante uncertainty entails that there is
a chance that at least one of the current incumbents can lose office. The last four elections
in Russia are examples of violations of this rule, since it was obvious to any observer that the
United Russia Party would win the elections, and that Vladimir Putin in 2000, 2004 and 2012
and Dmitry Medvedev in 2008 undoubtedly would assume the presidential office. Second, ex-
post irreversibility means that the final result is irreversible and valid, in the sense that the
winner of the election is allowed to take office. The 2010 elections in Coˆte d’Ivoire, postponed
since 2005, violates this rule, given that sitting President Laurent Gbagbo refused to leave
office after suffering an election defeat against opposition leader Alassane Ouattara. Only after
five months of battles between Gbagbo- and Outtara-friendly soldiers was Gbagbo captured
3Acknowledging the lack of consensus regarding what separates autocracies and democracies in the literature,
I re-estimate the analysis with a dichotomization of the Polity scale (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2010) in Chapter
5 to show that the results are not dependent upon choice of operationalization.
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and forced to step down. Third, repeatability ensures that the winning party does not rewrite
the rules in their favor and disallow contestation in the future. In other words, ‘all political
outcomes must be temporary: Losers do not forfeit the right to compete in the future, to
negotiate again, to influence legislation, to pressure the bureaucracy, or to seek recourse in
courts’ (Przeworski et al. 1996, 6). Furthermore, similar to the transfer of power test identified
by Beetham (1999, 70), it is necessary that the governing party loses an election and willingly
steps down. Indeed, ‘democracy is a system in which parties lose elections’ (Przeworski (1991) in
Przeworski et al. 1996, 5). In other words, a regime is considered autocratic until an incumbent
party has lost office after governing. This rule means that countries such as Botswana, where
BDP has ruled uninterrupted since 1969, and South Africa, where the ANC has governed since
the end of Apartheid, both countries that by many observers’ standards allow frequent, free
and fair elections, are labeled as dictatorships. Put differently, as explained in Przeworski et al.
(1996, 10–13), all ambiguous cases are considered to be dictatorships, favoring false negatives
(Type II errors). An inspection of the 882 country years in question show that their Polity
score ranges from -9 to +9 (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2010). Moreover, only 173 observations
score +6 and higher on the Polity score. Such a small number of observations are unlikely
to significantly alter the results, and I therefore conclude that possible false negatives is not a
problem.4
Now that I have identified how to differentiate between autocracies and democracies, I turn to
operationally distinguish between different kinds of nondemocracies. More specifically, I identify
the kinds of autocracies that I propose are less likely to be subjected to coup attempts, namely
the ones with a legislature, party/parties and elections.
3.2.3 Main Independent Variables
Many attempts have been made to classify different authoritarian regimes (Diamond 2002;
Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gates et al. 2006; Geddes 2006; Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 2006;
Levitsky and Way 2002; Magaloni 2010; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Wright 2008a,b). However,
many classifications are muddy or too general to test the research question at hand. Take, for
example, the categorizations provided by Gates et al. (2006) and Cheibub (2007). As mentioned
above, the first is unclear about the exact nature of “inconsistent regimes”. For instance: what
is the specific institutional structure of these regimes, apart from the fact that they are not suf-
ficiently constrained or free? Intuitively, one might interpret “inconsistent” to mean autocracies
with nominally democratic institutions. Moreover, the latter classification merely focuses on the
processes in the inner sanctums of the regime completely disregarding what external support
the regime may or may not have. According to this typology, ‘monarchs rely on family and
kin networks ... military rulers confine key potential rivals from the armed forces within juntas;
4In Table 1 in Appendix 2 I demonstrate that my conclusion is correct by estimating the core models without
these 173 observations. The results remain unchanged.
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and civilian dictators usually create a smaller body within a regime party, a political bureau’
(Cheibub 2007, 161). All of these statements may be true, but it does not explain why some
monarchic and military ruling cliques hold elections and allow legislatures and parties, nor why
some civilian cliques do not. In order to test hypotheses 1,2 and 4 then, whether nominally
democratic institutions in autocracies are instruments for co-optation and deterrence, I build
upon previous classifications to isolate autocracies exhibiting the desired criteria into three fo-
cus variables. All three are constructed from the dataset introduced in Przeworski et al. (1996)
and extended by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010). In addition, I utilized the extended
Vanhanen (2000) data to identify parties that hold 2/3 or more of the legislative seats.
Legislative body in autocracy is a dichotomous variable identifying autocracies in which
there exists a non-elective or elective legislature that is not unconstitutionally closed. This vari-
able disregards the existence of parties or elections.
Legislative body w/at least one party is a dichotomous variable identifying autocracies
in which there exists a non-elective or elective legislature with one or multiple parties that is
not unconstitutionally closed.
Ruling party displays strength is a dichotomous variable identifying autocracies in which
there exists an elected legislature with one or multiple parties and the incumbent party holds
2/3 or more of the legislative seats.
Using the same sources, I create four new binomial variables that classify whether the legislature
contains one or multiple parties in order to test Hypothesis 2a, 2b and 4b. Finally, I include
three more variables:
Coup-initiated autocracies is a dichotomous variable identifying all autocratic country-
years in which the ruling clique came to power in a coup. An autocracy is identified as coup-
initiated even if the rulers change the institutional design, but not if changes are made to the
inner sanctums of the regime, since the fundamental nature of the regime and the incumbents
then changes. For instance, today’s Syria and Rwanda are coup-initiated, on account of the way
Hafez al-Assad and Paul Kagame came to power in 1971 and 1994 respectively. Moreover, the
military nature of both the Syrian and Rwandan ruling cliques has not changed since assuming
power. This variable is constructed from the coup data provided by Powell and Thyne (2011)
and the institutions data in Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
Creation of one party in autocracy and creation of multiple parties in autocracy
are two dichotomous variables identifying whether autocratic incumbents established a legisla-
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ture with one or multiple parties. If a formal party platform is established in the legislature in
an autocracy, the variables takes the value 1 in all subsequent years until there is a change in
either a) the inner sanctum of the autocracy or b) the party structure of the autocracy.
By creating an interaction term between coup-initiated autocracies and the creation of one or
multiple support parties I test Hypothesis 6, whether coup makers that establish a support party
platform are less likely to be subjected to a coup attempt.
3.2.4 Control Variables
In addition to the main independent variables, the core models include four variables that have
previously proved to have predictive power in the coup and democratization literature and that
corrects for time-dependent observations. Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables
in the core models.
First, simultaneously taking into account that time-series observations are not independent
of each other, and the importance of regime consolidation (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza
2009, 10-11), I construct a regime duration variable from the data in Cheibub, Gandhi and
Vreeland (2010). I define a regime as the institutional framework of a state. Furthermore, a
regime transition is defined as any event that altered this institutional structure, either through
a coup, the breakdown or establishment of democracy, or institutional reforms. By changes to
the institutional framework in an autocracy, I refer to the establishment or abolishment of a
legislature and/or changes in the party structure of the legislature. The party structure of the
legislature is threefold, either no parties, one party or multiple parties exist. Moving from one
category to another constitutes a change. Moreover, regime transition can also be a change
in the inner sanctums of the autocracy. The inner sanctums of autocracies are, as described
by Cheibub (2007), defined by the type of autocrat. A military leader relies on his ties to
the military, a monarch relies upon family relations, while civilian autocrats must create new
platforms of support, be it a clique of elites or a formal party. Moreover, regime consolidation
is an elusive concept, and arguably impossible to “observe”. I refer to regime consolidation as
what Schedler (2001) terms “backward-looking”, meaning that consolidation is a function of past
stability. In other words, the longer-lasting the institutional constellation, the more consolidated
it is. Tying this to Collier and Hoeﬄer (2005), the regime will ultimately be legitimized through
tradition, or rather, as a function of its durability. Long-lasting regimes should thus be less
likely to be attempted overthrown. Regime duration is a count variable that equals 1 in the
year after a regime transition.
Second, lagged level of economic development and lagged economic growth from Maddison
(2006) is added to the models. Since Lipset (1959) argued that level of economic development
increased the chances of a country being democratic, many scholars have affirmed the claims
(e.g. Diamond 1992; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000; Boix and Stokes
2003; Hadenius and Teorell 2005). In the coup literature, the evidence is more inconclusive.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of variables in core models: Autocracies only
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Coup attempt 0.061 0.239 0 1 4396
Legislative body in autocracy 0.74 0.439 0 1 4396
Legislative body w/at least one party 0.677 0.468 0 1 4396
Ruling party displays strength 0.549 0.498 0 1 4396
One-party autocracy 0.342 0.474 0 1 4396
Multiparty autocracy 0.335 0.472 0 1 4396
One-party autocracy displaying strength 0.33 0.47 0 1 4396
Multiparty autocracy displaying strength 0.223 0.416 0 1 4396
Coup-initiated regime 0.367 0.482 0 1 4396
Creation of one party in autocracy 0.229 0.42 0 1 4396
Creation of multiple parties in autocracy 0.105 0.307 0 1 4396
Regime duration 9.593 9.298 1 58 4396
Logged GDP per capita 7.546 0.9 5.333 10.667 4396
GDP growth 4.188 6.941 -62.901 77.414 4396
Previous coup attempt 0.544 0.498 0 1 4396
Some studies indicate that high GDP per capita decreases the chances of coups, others find
that it increases and yet others find no effect (Belkin and Schofer 2003). This confusion is not
surprising, when one considers that most research on the occurrence of coups have been both
spatially and temporally constrained. Only by estimating the effects with a comprehensive data
set containing coup attempts over an extended time period is it possible to say something about
the general pattern. Focusing on one continent, one or two decades or only a selection of the
countries in the world increase the chances of biased results. The analysis corrects this problem
and estimates the effect of economic level of development on a comprehensive dataset by adding
a log-transformed variable of GDP per capita. Additionally, Przeworski and Limongi (1997)
find that economic crises increase the probability of regime breakdown. It is easy to imagine
that coup plotters are more likely to conspire, and have an easier job mobilizing other elites, the
military, and potentially the masses if the country is in a recession rather than booming.
Third, I include a dummy variable for coup history constructed from Powell and Thyne
(2011). This variable takes the value 1 if a government in the country at any point since 1950
has been attempted overthrown. Since coups cluster in both time and space, this variable
should further correct for time-dependent observations. Arguably, it also captures a coup trap
effect that is substantively different from the one modeled by the coup-initiated autocracies
dummy, since it includes both successful coups and unsuccessful attempts at overthrowing the
incumbents.
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3.3 Omitted Variable Bias
As noted above, the core models are intentionally minimalistic in order to avoid the inclusion
of irrelevant variables. As explained by King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 182-183), a cautious
“include everything” approach can be very costly because ‘even if the control variable has no
causal effect on the dependent variable, the more correlated the main explanatory variable is
with the irrelevant control variable, the less efficient is the estimate of the main causal ef-
fect’. However, more efficient models should also be approached with caution because there is
a possibility of excluding variables that influence both the independent variable and the main
explanatory variable. In that case, the results would be biased. For instance, not including
coup history as a control variable may bias the results because coup makers or incumbents that
are attempted overthrown may try to concentrate power to a limited group by shutting down
the legislature and banning parties in order to regain control and get rid of potential rivals.
This is along the lines of the argument by Kuran (1989, 66), that ‘major revolutions tend to be
followed by massive campaigns of repression and indoctrination whose targets include many of
the revolutionaries themselves’. In other words, coup history may affect both the institutional
design of autocracies and the probability of coup attempts. The question in relation to this
specific analysis thus becomes: is the effect of nominally democratic institutions endogenous?
If institutions under authoritarianism matter, then they influence outcomes by generating in-
centives for potential rivals to support the regime as explained by the theoretical framework. If
institutions are endogenous however, ‘their form and their functioning depend on the conditions
under which they emerge and endure’ (Przeworski 2004, 527). In that case institutions do not
affect outcomes, rather, they are mere symptoms of some independent variable(s) exogenous to
a regime’s institutional design.
Facing possible endogeneity, the only remedy is prudent testing of my assumptions. After
the core analyses, I therefore perform a number of model diagnostics and robustness tests in
order to ensure, to the extent possible, that the results are not biased. Notably, in addition
to inspecting the assumptions of the statistical model, I take an in-depth look at three coups
that the core models do a poor job at predicting and attempt to identify structural factors that
may influence both institutional design and coup attempts. Similarly, bias may be caused by
idiosyncrasies in the data set. For instance, Africa is often cited as one of the most coup-prone
regions in the world. Additionally, some decades see more coup attempts than others. If the
results are driven by region- or time-specific anomalies they are not generalizable. I also estimate
country fixed-effects models in order to allow a unique intercept for each country.5 In sum, six
additional variables, region, decade, logged total military budget, exclusion of ethnic groups,
infant mortality rate and civil liberties are discussed below and added to the core models to
ensure the validity of the findings presented by the core models.
5I elaborate upon country fixed-effects in Chapter 5.
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3.4 Statistical Model
Given that the dependent variables coup attempt and successful coup are both binary – measuring
a discrete outcome – whether or not there have been attempts, unsuccessful or successful, at
overthrowing the incumbent, all models presented below are logistic regressions. The basic
model is specified as:
Pr(yi = 1) = logit
−1(Xiβ) (3.1)
in which Pr(yi = 1) denotes the probability of an outcome (e.g. coup attempt) and the linear




transforms values into probabilities ranging from 0–1. I report all estimates as odds ratios.6
Moreover, all models are fitted with standard errors clustered by country to correct for time
dependence of observations (Long and Freese 2006, 86-87). In other words, the models reports
the probability of being subjected to a coup attempt, given a regime’s institutional design,
duration, history of coup attempts and economic situation.
6Interpretation is as follows: odds ratios below 1 decrease the chances of outcome while odds ratios above 1
increase the chances of outcome happening relative to the previous value of variable x. For instance, an odds ratio
of 1.50 means that for each increase in x, the chances of the outcome increases by 50 %. The 95 % confidence
intervals are displayed in brackets illustrating the uncertainty of the odds ratio.
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Chapter 4
Results
I will in the following present the results of the empirical analysis. In all tables and figures
below, successful overthrows of the incumbent will be referred to as coups, while unsuccessful
endeavors are labeled unsuccessful coup attempts. A coup attempt includes both successful and
unsuccessful overthrows. In order to ensure that the data supports the theoretical assumptions
and that the main findings in the multivariate analysis are not driven by the inclusion of multiple
independent variables, I first present descriptive statistics providing evidence for the theoretical
framework. This is in line with Achen (2005, 338), suggesting that ‘the research habits of the
[quantitative] profession need greater emphasis on classic skills that generated so much of what
we know in quantitative social science: plots, crosstabs and just plain looking at data’. These
simple, basic methods are very powerful tools to observe and uncover trends in the data, and
helps avoiding inferential errors. Second, I turn to the multivariate regression analysis. Third,
I evaluate the models’ performance. Finally, I take an in-depth look at the three coups with
the lowest predicted probability according to my preferred model, namely Liberia 1980, Tunisia
1987 and Paraguay 1989 in order to both validate the mechanisms of the theoretical framework
and identify possibly omitted structural variables for a first robustness test of the results.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
I first address the frequency of coup attempts and institutional design of regimes in the 1950–
2008 period. Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of the world’s independent states subjected to
coup attempts in the period.1 The graph reveals that coup attempts were most prevalent
in the 50’s and 60’s before steadily declining from the mid-70’s. Since 2000, the number of
coup attempts a year has been below 4 compared to 15 in the peak year 1966. In Figure
4.2 I have plotted the percentage of regimes according to institutional design. It shows how
the number of autocracies without legislatures increase following the period with the highest
frequency of attempted overthrows, peaking in the mid-70’s at nearly 30 % and declining until
1From 1950–2008 the number of states in the world has more than doubled, from 81 to 192.
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Figure 4.1: Coup Attempts and Successful Coups 1950–2008





























regimes without nominally democratic institutions only make out 4 % in 2008. The trend for
democracies is exactly opposite, decreasing in the most coup-prone period, and increasing since
the start of the third wave of democratization. In the same period, the percentage of autocracies
with nominally democratic institutions is relatively stable with peaks in the mid-60’s and mid-
80’s. In 2008, these regimes make out about 35 % of all sovereign states. Also, Figure 4.2
shows that since the end of the Cold War, the number of autocracies with nominally democratic
institutions have been stable. This illustrates the pattern identified by Brumberg (2002), in
which autocracies that adopted seemingly democratic features during the third wave continued
to be ruled nondemocratically. Additionally, contrary to many reflections (see e.g. Levitsky and
Way 2002; Diamond 2002; O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986), these “hybrid regimes”
are not “new”, but have been a prevalent type of autocracy since 1950. Today, nearly all
autocrats rule regimes with some sort of nominally democratic institution in place, and coup
attempts are rare.
Table 4.1 provides preliminary evidence for H1,H2,H2a,H2b,H4 and H4b, namely that au-
tocracies with nominally democratic institutions are less likely than other autocracies to be
attempted overthrown. The table reports the percentage of country years in which there were
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no coup attempts, unsuccessful attempts, and successful coups by categories of institutional de-
sign corresponding to the hypotheses. 11.4 % of country years in autocracies without any form of
nominally democratic institutions are attempted couped, while the same number for autocracies
with legislatures is 4.2 %. Moreover, autocracies without parties have recorded a higher percent-
age of coup attempted country years than autocracies with parties. That is true whether there
exists one or multiple parties in the legislature. Also, autocracies displaying strength through
elections are less frequently attempted overthrown than autocracies that do not. Democracies
seem to be the least prone to coup attempts, with coup attempts in only 3.3 % of all country
years. Table 4.1 also reveals that nominally democratic institutions do not lower the chances of
an attempted overthrow being successful. The observed frequency of successful coups compared
to unsuccessful attempts is close to 50–50 in all regimes. That means that although institutions
under authoritarianism might co-opt and deter possible rivals from attempting an overthrow,
these rivals are not likely to intervene on behalf of the incumbent if a coup is attempted. In
other words, these numbers do not support H3.
2 As discussed above however, Powell and Thyne
2Multivariate logistic models (not reported) affirm this finding.
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Table 4.1: Institutional Features and Coup Attempts: Democracies Included (%)
Institutional Feature No coup Unsuccessful coup Coup
Autocracy: No legislature 88.6 5.3 6.1
Autocracy: Legislature 95.8 2.1 2.1
Autocracy: No parties 90.9 4.2 4.9
Autocracy: One party 95.5 2.2 2.3
Autocracy: Multiple party 95.3 2.5 2.2
Not displaying strength 91.7 4.0 4.3
Displaying strength: One party 95.5 2.1 2.3
Displaying strength: Multiple party 96.0 1.9 2.0
Democracy 96.7 1.5 1.8
Total 95.0 2.4 2.6
Numbers are row percentages of country years. For instance, there were no coup attempts in 88.6 %, unsuccessful coups in 5.3 % and successful
coups in 6.1 % of the country years classified as “Autocracy: No legislature”.
(2011) concede that unsuccessful coups might be harder to identify than successful coups. Put
differently, the “true” frequency of unsuccessful coups may be underrepresented in the dataset
relative to successful coups and that could have an impact on H3. Unfortunately, there is no
way of knowing how the unobserved coup attempts would be distributed among the regime type
categories in Table 4.1.
In Table 4.2 I illustrate the same information with logistic regressions. The independent
variables are coup attempts – including both successful and unsuccessful coups – and successful
coups only. As mentioned above, all models report estimates as odds ratios. Specifically, the
estimate for “legislative body in autocracy” in Model Base 1 shows that, on average, the in-
cumbents in these regimes are 65 % less likely to be attempted overthrown than incumbents in
autocracies without nominally democratic institutions. As revealed in Table 4.2, the estimates
in all ten models are below 1 and significant, strengthening the preliminary evidence for the
theoretical framework.
Next, I turn to the multivariate analysis.
4.2 Multivariate Logistic Regression Results
This section presents the findings of twelve models. I proceed by first presenting the results
testing H1, H2 and H4, whether autocracies with a legislature, autocracies with at least one
party in the legislature and incumbents displaying strength through elections are less likely
than other autocracies to be subjected to coup attempts. Also, according to H5, coup-initiated
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Table 4.3: Estimated odds of coup attempts and successful coups, all autocracies 1950–2008 (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
Legislative body in autocracy 0.554∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
[0.398,0.770] [0.316,0.728]
Legislative body w/at least one party 0.682∗ 0.596∗∗
[0.500,0.930] [0.409,0.868]
Ruling party displays strength 0.690∗ 0.680+
[0.510,0.933] [0.452,1.023]
Coup-initiated autocracy 1.215 1.578 1.294 1.704+ 1.331 1.786∗
[0.815,1.811] [0.891,2.792] [0.867,1.931] [0.963,3.012] [0.896,1.975] [1.013,3.148]
Regime duration 0.930∗∗∗ 0.955∗ 0.923∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗
[0.901,0.959] [0.921,0.990] [0.895,0.952] [0.913,0.984] [0.897,0.954] [0.914,0.984]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.806∗ 0.771∗ 0.801∗ 0.766∗ 0.802∗ 0.768∗
[0.675,0.962] [0.605,0.984] [0.666,0.965] [0.598,0.982] [0.666,0.966] [0.597,0.988]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.993 0.992 0.993 0.991 0.993 0.992
[0.974,1.013] [0.969,1.015] [0.974,1.013] [0.969,1.015] [0.974,1.013] [0.969,1.016]
Previous coup attempt 1.658∗ 1.072 1.722∗ 1.112 1.695∗ 1.119
[1.064,2.584] [0.590,1.948] [1.105,2.685] [0.616,2.009] [1.089,2.638] [0.621,2.018]
Observations 4396 4396 4396 4396 4396 4396
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.062 0.078 0.057 0.078 0.054
LL0 -1006.643 -613.456 -1006.643 -613.456 -1006.643 -613.456
LL -923.458 -575.150 -928.138 -578.389 -928.400 -580.151
Logistic regressions; Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
autocracies should be more likely to experience coup attempts. Second, I turn my attention to
the disaggregated hypotheses, H2a, H2b and H4b, and inspect whether the effects are similar for
one-party and multiple party autocracies. The final two models evaluates H6, namely whether
coup makers establishing a support party platform are less likely to be attempted overthrown.
All models include controls for regime duration, logged GDP per capita, GDP growth and
previous coup attempt.
The results in Table 4.3 suggest that autocracies with nominally democratic institutions
are less likely to be subjected to both coup attempts and successful coups and hence provides
evidence in support of H1, H2 and H4. With the exception of Model 6, the odds ratios for
autocracies with a legislative body, a legislative body with at least one party and autocracies
displaying strength through elections are all below 1 and significant at the 0.05 level. Follow-
ing the theoretical framework, these institutions generate incentives for potential rivals to join
and support the regime by credibly sharing power and portraying that the current ruling clique
represents “the only game in town”. Conversely, potential rivals in autocracies without these
institutions in place are more likely to be excluded from decision making, the possibility of ad-
vancing in the regime and benefiting from regime spoils. Because of their relative marginalization
they are thus more likely to organize rebellion and stage coup attempts.
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However, the support for H2 and H4 come with one important caveat. Interestingly, the
effect for “legislative body in autocracy” is the strongest, indicating that although parties may
be utilized to credibly share power with the elite, they are not necessarily vital. The logistic
regressions in Table 2 in Appendix 2 reveal that there is no difference in the propensity to be
subjected to a coup attempt based on the party structure in autocracies with a national legisla-
ture.3 In other words, autocracies with legislatures that do not allow parties are not more likely
to be attempted overthrown than autocracies that allow one or multiple parties. Additionally,
Table 2 in Appendix 2 shows that the same is true for the argument that displaying strength
through elections is vital for deterring the elites. Ruling cliques arranging elections and confi-
dently winning them are undoubtedly less likely to be attempted overthrown than autocracies
without nominally democratic institutions in place, but not less inclined than other institutional-
ized autocracies.4 Indeed, there is no evidence that institutional differences between autocracies
with some variant of nominally democratic institutions in place differ in their propensity to be
subjected to coup attempts. However, almost 90 % of autocracies with legislatures also allow
official parties, making it hazardous to draw inferences regarding the importance of parties in a
legislature compared to no parties.5 Nonetheless, the position argued by Magaloni (2008) and
Geddes (2006), that legislatures on their own are not sufficient and that parties are crucial, is
not supported by the data.
More substantively, using the CLARIFY-package (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000)6, the
expected probability of a coup attempt is 4.3 % in Model 1.7 Moreover, with all the other inde-
pendent variables at their means, the simulated probability of a coup attempt in an autocracy
without nominally democratic institutions is 6.6 %, while it is 3.7 % for autocracies with any
kind of nominally democratic institution. In other words, the model predicts a 43 % drop in the
risk of being attempted overthrown for autocrats ruling with legislatures. Figure 4.3 is a box
plot of the simulated probabilities. The rectangles are bordered at the 25th and 75th quartile
and the whiskers are extended to the smallest and largest value within 1.5 times the 25th or 75th
quartile. The dots are outside (extreme) values. The graph illustrates the drop in probability
of a coup attempt for autocracies with nominally democratic institutions, while simultaneously
showing the uncertainty of estimates. Notably, the lowest predicted probabilities of autocra-
3The regressions in Table 2 in Appendix 2 estimate the probability of coup attempts and coups in autocracies
allowing a national legislature. The four models correspond to Model 3-6 excluding all autocracies without
nominally democratic institutions in place.
4These include autocracies with a no party legislature and one or multiple party autocracies not displaying
strength through elections.
5Examples of autocracies with no party legislatures are Libya, Kuwait and Bhutan.
6CLARIFY is a widely used program to calculate quantities of substantive interest to the scholar. For example,
in logistic models, the coefficients or odds ratios are hard to interpret substantively. Moreover, the uncertainty
of the estimates is often ignored or forgotten. Using CLARIFY, it is possible to calculate the substantive impact
(the simulated probability) of y if x changes from 0 to 1.
7The expected probability is Pr(y = 1) with all variables at their means.
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Figure 4.3: Model 1 – Box plot of simulated probabilities of coup attempt in autocracies with





























































cies without legislatures are aligned with the average probability of autocracies with nominally
democratic institutions in place. Also, it seems that the predicted values in institutionalized
autocracies are less divergent, while autocracies without these institutions are assigned both
very high (11 %) and low (lower than 4 %) probabilities. However, these are extreme values. In
all the box plots presented, I have included notches. The notches are the barely visible dents in
the center of the boxes of Figure 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. Since the notches do not overlap in any of
the figures it is likely that the medians of the calculated probabilities are significantly different
from each other (Chambers et al. 1983).
The odds ratios indicate that evidence for H5 is tentative. Coup-initiated autocracies are not
necessarily more likely to be attempted overthrown. Only the estimates in Models 4 and 6 are
significant at .1 level. Seen in conjunction with Model 1,3 and 5, estimating the probability of
coup attempts, the results might indicate that coup attempts against coup-initiated autocracies
are more often successful than in other regimes. This finding is aligned with the expectation
that coup-initiated autocracies are more brittle than other regimes, likely due to the initial
chaos, reorganizing, loss of material, manpower and legitimacy in the immediate aftermath of
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Table 4.4: Estimated odds of coup attempts and successful coups, all autocracies 1950–2008 (2)
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
One-party autocracy 0.705∗ 0.603∗
[0.507,0.982] [0.393,0.926]
Multiparty autocracy 0.662+ 0.590∗
[0.435,1.009] [0.375,0.926]
One-party autocracy displaying strength 0.764+ 0.704+
[0.560,1.044] [0.465,1.067]
Multiparty autocracy displaying strength 0.583∗ 0.607+
[0.360,0.945] [0.348,1.060]
Coup-initiated autocracy 1.291 1.702+ 1.327 1.778∗
[0.863,1.932] [0.962,3.013] [0.893,1.973] [1.009,3.133]
Regime duration 0.923∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗ 0.924∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗
[0.895,0.951] [0.914,0.983] [0.896,0.952] [0.914,0.983]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.804∗ 0.767∗ 0.809∗ 0.771∗
[0.667,0.969] [0.598,0.983] [0.670,0.978] [0.598,0.995]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.993 0.992 0.994 0.992
[0.974,1.013] [0.968,1.015] [0.974,1.014] [0.969,1.016]
Previous coup attempt 1.732∗ 1.114 1.721∗ 1.126
[1.107,2.710] [0.615,2.020] [1.106,2.678] [0.624,2.034]
Observations 4396 4396 4396 4396
Pseudo R2 0.078 0.057 0.079 0.055
LL0 -1006.643 -613.456 -1006.643 -613.456
LL -928.077 -578.384 -927.298 -579.681
Logistic regressions; Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
overthrows (see e.g. Geddes 2009; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2005). Interestingly, the estimates for the
variable identifying countries that have previously been subjected to a coup attempt are higher
than 1 and significant in Models 1,3 and 5. There is thus reason to believe that both previous
successful and unsuccessful coups heighten the risk of subsequent coup attempts. In other words,
attempts at overthrowing the regime are destabilizing events whether the coup makers succeed
or not. All else equal, a country without a history of coup attempts have a 3.3 % simulated risk
of a coup attempt, while the risk is 5.4 % for countries with a history of coup attempts.
Unsurprisingly, the odds ratios for regime duration and level of economic development are
significant and below 1. Indeed, consolidated and rich regimes are less likely to experience coup
attempts. In Model 1, the simulated probability of a coup attempt in an autocracy without
nominally democratic institutions, the mean GDP per capita income of autocracies, 1800 USD,
that was altered 5 years ago and in which the incumbents have previously been attempted
overthrown is about 11 %. In an institutionalized autocracy that was altered 10 years ago with
the mean income and a history of coup attempts, the simulated risk of a coup attempt is more
than half as likely, at 4.6 %. Moreover, doubling GDP per capita from 1800 to 3600 USD
decreases the simulated probability of a coup attempt in autocracies with .5 % from 4.3 % to
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3.8 %. Finally, economic growth does not seem to affect the probability of neither attempted
nor actual overthrows.
Table 4.4, evaluating the disaggregated hypotheses H2a, H2b and H4b, whether both one-
party and multiparty autocracies are less likely than no-party autocracies to be subjected to
attempted overthrows, reveal patterns very similar to the ones in Models 1-6. Estimates are in
the expected direction and all are significant at the .1 level. Both autocracies with one party
and multiple parties seem to effectively contribute to co-opting potential rivals and deterring
them from performing both attempted and actual overthrows. However, since the discussion
above indicates that there is no difference in the propensity to be subjected to a coup attempt
in autocracies with some variant of nominally democratic institutions, I have also estimated the
models in Table 4.4 including a dummy for no-party autocracies with a legislature. By doing
so, I estimate the effect of no, one and multiple parties in a legislature compared to autocracies
without any form of nominally democratic institutions. The results are displayed in Table 3
in Appendix 2 and the estimates for no-party, one-party and multiple party autocracies are all
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Table 4.5: Estimated odds of coup attempts and successful coups, all autocracies 1950–2008 (3)
(1) (2)
Coup attempt Coup
Creation of one party in autocracy 1.249 1.097
[0.697,2.236] [0.487,2.472]
Coup-initiated autocracy 1.815∗∗ 2.337∗
[1.161,2.839] [1.130,4.835]
Coup-intitiated * Creation of one party 0.401∗ 0.364∗
[0.186,0.866] [0.135,0.985]
Creation of multiple parties in autocracy 0.509 0.545
[0.225,1.151] [0.181,1.644]
Coup-initiated * Creation of multiple parties 1.184 1.123
[0.373,3.755] [0.286,4.411]
Regime duration 0.926∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗
[0.899,0.954] [0.918,0.986]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.792∗ 0.750∗
[0.655,0.959] [0.581,0.970]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.994 0.993
[0.975,1.013] [0.971,1.016]
Previous coup attempt 1.808∗∗ 1.286
[1.169,2.796] [0.663,2.494]
Observations 4396 4396
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.062
LL0 -1006.643 -613.456
LL -921.845 -575.710
Logistic regressions; Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
significant below 1 and further illustrate that parties are not necessarily vital to credibly share
power. H2a, H2b and H4b are thus confirmed with the same caveat as H2 and H4.
Moving to simulated probabilities, in Model 8, the expected probability of a successful coup
is 2.4 %. The simulated risk of being overthrown for incumbents in autocracies allowing no
legislature or a no-party legislature is 2.8 %, while the probability is about 1.8 % for one-party
and multiparty nondemocracies. Figure 4.4 box plots the simulated probabilities and shows
that the values are more overlapping than in Figure 4.3 and that the predicted values in all
three categories are similarly dispersed. Some of the overlap is likely due to the fact that the
no legislature/no parties category includes no-party autocracies credibly sharing power utilizing
a legislature. In sum, the co-optation effects are very similar regardless of party structure in
autocracies with a legislature. The estimates for coup-initiated autocracies and the control
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Figure 4.5: Model 12 – Box plot of simulated probabilities of coup attempt over creation of a
























































































variables are similar to the ones in Models 1-6.
Table 4.5 turns to H6, namely whether coup makers establishing a support party platform are
less likely to be attempted overthrown. The model provides several insights. First, coup-initiated
autocracies in which incumbents do not create a support party platform are more likely to both
be subjected to coup attempts and to be overthrown. As in the previous models, the effect seems
to be stronger for successful coups. Second, coup-initiated autocracies that establish a one-party
platform are less likely to be subjected to illegal attempts at overthrowing the incumbent. This
might explain the tentative results in Model 1-10, where both coup-initiated autocracies creating
and not creating parties were assessed jointly. Third, the “positive” effects of party creation
is restricted to one party in coup-initiated autocracies. Incumbents in autocracies that are not
coup-initiated and establish a one party support platform are not less likely to be attempted
overthrown. In fact, the estimate is in the opposite direction but insignificant. The most likely
reason is that changes to the institutional framework often are related to threats to the regime.
For instance, Hegre et al. (2001) find that regime changes are associated with civil war onsets.
Moreover, allowing more parties does not seem to have an effect on the probability of being
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subjected to coup attempts. The sign for the interaction term is even in the opposite direction
of what would be expected. Indeed, it seems that there is risk involved if coup makers opens up
for multiple parties in a national legislature, but that the establishment of a one-party regime
effectively co-opts and deters the potential rivals as argued in the theoretical framework. Finally,
the estimate for opening for multiple parties in regimes that are not coup-initiated is negative
but insignificant.8 In sum, the findings are ambiguous regarding the creation of a support party
platform.
Regardless, failure to broaden the base of the regime and credibly share power seems excep-
tionally hazardous to coup makers. Figure 4.5 box plots the simulated probabilities for Model
12. The mean simulated probability of a coup makers that does not create a party support
base in a national legislature being displaced through a coup is 4 %, while the probability for
coup-initiated autocracies that establish a one party regime is 1.1 %.
In sum, the multivariate analyses find evidence for the theoretical proposition that autocra-
cies with nominally democratic institutions are less likely to be both attempted overthrown and
successfully couped. This is true for autocracies allowing both one party and multiple parties
in national legislatures. H1, H2, H2a, H2b, H4 and H4b are thus all supported by the analysis.
However, the analysis identifies caveats regarding H2, H2a, H2b, H4 and H4b. First, authori-
tarian regimes with one or multiple parties are not less likely to be attempted overthrown than
autocracies with a no-party legislature. Similarly, autocracies with at least a legislature are not
more coup prone than autocrats displaying strength through elections. Moreover, the support
for H5 is tentative, likely because there is a difference in the likelihood of coup attempts in
coup-initiated autocracies conditional on whether the incumbents rely on a support party base.
Indeed, I find that coup makers who establish a one-party regime are less likely to be attempted
overthrown, while opening up for multiple parties has no effect. H6 is thus partially supported.
Finally, I find no support for the hypothesized heightened probability of a coup attempt failing
in institutionalized autocracies, and therefore reject H3.
4.2.1 Assessing Model Performance
I will in the following evaluate the models’ predictive performance. Although a variable may be
significant in a regression analysis, it may be poor at predicting the correct outcome. In order
to test the predictive performance of institutions under authoritarianism on coup attempts, I
compare Model 1 above with Model 1 without the dummy for legislative body in autocracy in a
series of model performance tests. I label the latter Model 1*. First, I compare the log-likelihood
and the in-sample receiver operating characteristic curve (ROC-curve) of each model. Second,
I do out-of-sample predictions on random countries in the dataset. And finally, I present a
separation plot for Model 1, attempting to identify the events the model poorly predicts. All
8I exclude creation of multiple parties in autocracy from the robustness tests, since the estimates are insignif-
icant.
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Table 4.6: Comparing Model 1* and Model 1
(Model 1*) (Model 1)
Coup attempt Coup attempt
Legislative body in autocracy 0.554∗∗∗
[0.398,0.770]
Coup-initiated autocracy 1.387 1.215
[0.924,2.082] [0.815,1.811]
Regime duration 0.921∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗
[0.892,0.950] [0.901,0.959]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.805∗ 0.806∗
[0.661,0.979] [0.675,0.962]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.994 0.993
[0.974,1.014] [0.974,1.013]
Previous coup attempt 1.823∗∗ 1.658∗
[1.175,2.829] [1.064,2.584]
Observations 4396 4396
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.083
LL0 -1006.643 -1006.643
LL -932.102 -923.458
Logistic regressions; Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
three assessments will be discussed in detail below. Note that the goal of this section and the
thesis as a whole is not to comprehensively model the determinants of coup attempts, but to
evaluate the performance of indicators of the theory of elite deterrence. For better-performing
models there are many variables I could include, and I return to the inclusion of potentially
relevant independent variables in below, when addressing model diagnostics and robustness.
As explained by Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010), the ROC-curve plots the rate of predicted
true positives against the rate of predicted false positives for all thresholds of predicted values.
The area under the ROC-curve (the AUC) thus offers a visual and intuitive way of comparing
the predictive power of two models. A model that perfectly predicts every outcome would
have an AUC-value of 1, while flipping a coin would eventually take the value .5. The change
in the log-likelihood in Table 4.6 from Model 1* to Model 1, from -932 to -923, reflects the
same information displayed in Graph 4.6. The dummy variable identifying autocracies with
nominally democratic institutions moderately enhances the in-sample predictive accuracy of
the model. In the ROC-curve, the AUC increases by .01. Comparing the two ROC-curves
using the ROCCOMP program provided by Cleves (2002) shows that the increase is significant.
Put differently, the AUC increase indicates that the dummy variable improves the in-sample
predictive accuracy of which regimes will be attempted overthrown.
Table 4.7 presents out-of-sample predictions for the two models. To illustrate the out-
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Figure 4.6: ROC-curve: Model 1* and Model 1
of-sample prediction procedure, imagine that the population of countries in a small dataset
consists of Myanmar, Libya, North Korea and China from 1950–2008. I then randomly divide
these four countries into part ‘A’ and part ‘B’ such that the entire time-series for each country is
contained in each part (i.e. part ‘A’: Myanmar (1950–2008) and North Korea (1950–2008) and
part ‘B’: Libya (1950–2008) and China (1950–2008)). I then estimate the model on part ‘A’ and
predict on part ‘B’. In the actual out-of-sample prediction, part ‘B’ consists of approximately
2200 autocratic country-years of which governments were subjected to coup attempts in 120–
160 of them. I repeat this process ten times for Model 1* and Model 1. By repeating the
process I make sure that the result of the out-of-sample prediction is not biased by a lucky or
unlucky draw of countries. Thus, the numbers reported in Table 4.7 are the mean percentages
of these ten out-of-sample predictions of coup attempts compared with observed coup attempts.
Since the outcome variable is binary, I construct cutoff thresholds of predicted probabilities to
identify ’correctly’ predicted coup attempts. The reason is that no coup attempts are perfectly
predicted (100 % chance of coup attempt). This is especially true when modeling rare events,
where predicted probabilities of .5 are quite rare.9 In my preferred model, the highest predicted
probability of a coup is .26. I therefore operate with cutoff points at p=.2, p=.15 and p=.1
respectively. By looking at three different thresholds, I can evaluate whether the out-of-sample
predictive accuracy is consistent. Moreover, the main reason for estimating on each country’s
entire time-series instead of estimating on the early temporal part of the dataset (i.e. 1950-
9This is unsurprising. A situation in which a coup attempt is more likely than no coup attempt in a given
year is highly unlikely.
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Table 4.7: Out-of-sample predictions – Model 1* and Model 1
False positives True positives
p-cutoff p >=.1 p >= .15 p >= .2 p >= .1 p >= .15 p >= .2
Model 1* 21.5 % 3.5 % .1 % 43 % 7.6 % 0 %
Model 1 19.3 % 6.8 % .84 % 46.5 % 17.2 % 1.4 %
Negatives Positives
Model 1* % correct 95.4 % 94 % 93.8 % 11.7 % 11.2 % 0 %
Model 1 % correct 95.8 % 94.5 % 93.8 % 13.9 % 14.6 % 9.2 %
1990) and then attempting to forecast (i.e. 1991-2008) is that coup attempts tend to cluster
in both time and space, making the out-of-sample prediction a function of each country’s past.
The extreme case in point is Bolivia, that experienced 19 coup attempts from 1950 to 1984.
Put differently, the out-of-sample prediction method described above demands more from the
institution dummy than a temporal prediction.
The column “false positives” displays the percentage of autocratic country years in which the
model predicted an attempted overthrow when there was none, while the “true positives” column
shows the percentage of actual coup attempts predicted by the models. For instance, at the .1
threshold for Model 1* 21.5 % of country years are incorrectly classified as coup attempts while
43 % of the observed attempted overthrows in the data set are correctly predicted. Moreover,
the “negatives” and “positives” columns refer to how many of the predicted non-events and
events that are correctly classified. As displayed in Table 4.7 for example, at the .1 threshold,
coups were attempted in 11.7 % of the country years that Model 1* predicted there would be a
coup attempt. Moreover, there were no coup attempts in 95.4 % of the country years that the
same model predicted no coup attempt.
Starting by comparing false positives, Table 4.7 shows that Model 1 predicts fewer false
positives at the .1 and .2 thresholds, but nearly twice as many at the .15 cutoff. However, Model
1 also predicts more true positives than Model 1* at all thresholds, similarly more than doubling
the number of correctly identified at the .15 cutoff. Notice that Model 1* does not predict any
true positives at the highest threshold. In other words, my preferred model better predicts actual
coup attempts and, with the exception of the .15 threshold, predicts a lower percentage of false
positives. Comparing the percentage of predictions correctly classified reveals that both models
get most negative values right (93.8–95.8 %), which is what would be expected when attempting
to predict rare events. In addition, Model 1 seems to be better at predicting the occurrence of
coup attempts. The percentage of the predicted positives that were correctly classified is higher
at all thresholds, +2.2 %, +3.4 % and +9.2 % higher respectively.10 In sum, the legislative body
10The latter number is disproportionately high because of very few false and true positives at the p>=.2
threshold.
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Figure 4.7: Separation plot Model 1. Above: First coup attempts. Below: Subsequent coup
attempts
in autocracy dummy increases the out-of-sample predictive accuracy of the model.
Finally, I present separation plots, showing how the observed coup attempts (the vertical
lines) are distributed among the predicted probabilities from Model 1 (Greenhill, Ward and
Sacks 2011). In a separation plot, the observations are sorted by predicted probability. Hence,
the farther to the right the observed events are, the better the model predicts the events. I
use the separation plots to identify events that the model predicts poorly and attempt to verify
the underlying mechanisms outlined in Chapter 2 by in-depth case analysis. To do this I have
separated first events from subsequent events. There are two main reasons for the choice to do
so. First, there are a lot fewer first coup attempts than subsequent attempted overthrows (61
vs 206). Second, since coups breed coups, in the terminology of Londregan and Poole (1990), a
’coup trap’ should be identified by the model making subsequent events better predicted than
first events.
As is shown in the upper separation plot in Figure 4.7, the first coup attempts are scattered
quite evenly, and none of the events are assigned particularly high predicted probabilities of
happening. The interval is .5 % – 9 %, which means that none of the first events are correctly
identified by Model 1 according to the conventional thresholds utilized in the out-of-sample
test. This is a common occurrence in conflict research, in which one of the best predictors of
future conflict is past conflict. As expressed by Gleditsch and Nord˚as (2007): ‘unfortunately,
the precision in conflict prediction remains at the stage where meteorology was decades ago:
the best prediction for tomorrow’s weather was the weather today’. The best predicted first
events identified by the model are Angola (1977), Iran (1973) and Madagascar (1974), all newly
established regimes without nominally democratic institutions in place and level of development
below average. Among unexpected first events are the successful coups in Liberia and Tunisia
in 1980 and 1987. Both were relatively prosperous, institutionalized and long-lived autocracies.
In the bottom plot, a different pattern emerges. Subsequent events are indeed much better
predicted. Almost all events are clustered in the far right end of the plot. The most unexpected
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subsequent coup attempts include the successful coup against Stroessner in Paraguay in 1989, a
fairly prosperous and long-lived authoritarian regime with 26 years since the last alteration of the
institutional design. Others are the unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the oil-rich and long-lived
regime of Muammar al-Qaddaffi in 1993 and the successful displacement of Duvalier in Haiti in
1986. Among subsequent events that the model predicts well are the unsuccessful attempts to
overthrow Conte in Guinea in 1985, Strasser in Sierra Leone in 1995 and Malloum in Chad in
1976. All of these were young, poor autocracies without nominally democratic institutions and
a history of coup attempts.
In the following I take an in-depth look at the three successful overthrows that the model
does the worst job of predicting, namely the coups against Stroessner in Paraguay, Tolbert in
Liberia and Bourgiba in Tunisia. There are two main reasons for the choice of cases. First,
since all three were stable authoritarian regimes with nominally democratic institutions, then
the processes of elite co-optation and deterrence should be identifiable and further validate the
theoretical framework. Moreover, the Tunisian coup maker Ben Ali was not toppled until 2011.
Hence, his actions after coming to power should fit the theoretical framework. Second, since
these cases are unexpected, a closer inspection may shed light on structural factors that might
correlate with both institutions under authoritarianism and coup attempts. I can then add
proxies for these to the core models as a first robustness test.
4.2.2 Unexpected overthrows: Paraguay 1989, Liberia 1980 and Tunisia 1987
Befittingly, Roett (1989, 124) opens with the following take on Stroessner’s downfall:
Contrary to most predictions, General Alfredo Stroessner’s 35-year rule as dictator
of land-locked Paraguay ended abruptly in a violent coup d’etat. The world had
become so accustomed to the taciturn and repressive ruler that it was generally
assumed he would escape the fate of his fellow despots in the western hemisphere –
Anastazio Somoza in Nicaragua, Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Augusto
Pinochet in Chile – and leave office at a moment of his own choosing or die in bed
with his boots on.
Stroessnismo, the recipe that allowed the Paraguayan autocrat to rule together with his support
party, the Colorados, from 1954–1989, largely follows the pattern of the theoretical framework
outlined in this thesis. He first established personal authority over all the major institutions,
hired his support party colleagues as government ministers and awarded seats in the legislature
to significant members of society from other parties than his own. Additionally, his followers
benefited from the growing drug trafficking and ‘with the passing years, the general grew more
popular, on the evidence of his uncontested reelection every few years as president of the republic’
(Roett 1989, 128). Indeed, Stroessner credibly shared power with potential rivals, displayed
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strength through regular elections and shared spoils with party members and representatives in
the legislature.
In the 1980s however, Roett (1989) underlines that economic growth slowed, the public
deficit grew, inflation followed and U.S. aid declined.11 More importantly, tensions and uncer-
tainty dominated the inner sanctums of the regime. The Colorado party split into two rivaling
factions. Stroessner was aging and hospitalized, leaving elites doubting the regime’s durability
with the general as president. In the power struggles that emerged, coup maker General Andre´s
Rodr´ıguez, a loyalist since Stroessner came to power in 1954, was attempted demoted by the
Colorado party. At this point, Roett (1989, 138) notes that ‘there is no evidence that Stroessner
was part of, or fully informed about the deliberations under way. His recent illness and his
apparent abdication of every day decisions to the small group in the palace had removed him
from effective control over the regime’. In other words, the long-sitting general had effectively
vacated the presidential office when Rodr´ıguez, with the backing of the military, made a move
against the ruling clique and assumed power February 2., 1989.
What the Stroessner case indicates, is that intra-regime politics is of grave importance to
autocrats’ survival in office. Similarly, the steps taken by Ben Ali in Tunisia after overthrow-
ing Bourgiba in 1987 further strengthens the belief in the theoretical framework. Resembling
Stroessner’s last year in office, Ware (1988, 589) perceives that ‘Bourgiba took less and less note
of the magnitude of the problems besetting the nation. Hence he furnished ample opportunity
for sycophants to surround him’. However, what ultimately paved the way for Ben Ali’s rise to
power was when the courts favored the Islamist movement (MTI) in a trial initiated by Bourgiba
in which the regime claimed that the MTI were violent revolutionaries. The president’s power
was largely illegitimized by this loss and Prime Minister Ben Ali removed him from office by
having him declared unfit to meet the obligations of his office. This bold move was made pos-
sible by his close and trusting relationship with the military. Moreover, Ben Ali, who remained
in power until 2011, quickly started co-opting potential rivals. He embraced the outlawed (but
powerful) Islamist movement and the regional Arab brothers, he constituted a new government
consisting of mainly military foes and several important members of Bourgiba’s government. In
other words, Ben Ali successfully broadened the basis of support by acquiring the support of
both domestic and regional Islamist movements and offering high rank political offices to both
civilian and military potential rivals.
Finally, the unseating of Tolbert in Liberia in 1980 highlights a notable weakness of the
theoretical framework and the coding procedures of coup attempts, namely that coup makers do
not always belong to the elite benefiting from nominally democratic institutions. The indigenous
coup maker Master Sergeant Doe violently overthrew the ruling Americo-Liberian True Whig
Party (TWP) after over 100 years in power. Indeed, although coups more accurately capture
11However, the results of the core models reveal that economic growth does not affect the likelihood of coup
attempts.
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the core argument of the elite co-optation and deterrence, the Liberian overthrow illustrates
that the assumption is not necessarily always correct. Moreover, the case illustrates that ethnic
grievances may lead to attempted overthrows. Although Tolbert in the 70’s attempted to reform
the exclusionary politics of the ruling minority by removing laws on selective property rights and
allowing indigenous groups’ participation in politics, Okolo (1981) underlines ethnic grievances
as the most important motivation for the coup. Indeed, he emphasizes that ‘the reform efforts
proved insufficient to allay the hostility engendered by over a century of Americo-Liberian and
TWP monopoly of power’ (Okolo 1981, 150). The months preceding the coup witnessed many
signs of the regime’s crumbling power, soldiers defected and joined the masses in uprisings, un-
popular reforms were reverted to stagger further protests and the scheduled election in 1980 was
postponed due to uncertainty surrounding Tolbert’s continued rule. However, Okolo (1981, 154)
underlines that the reasons stated by Doe for the overthrow were not dissimilar from those cited
for other coups, namely ‘government neglect of the Liberian poor, rampant corruption, illegal
searches and seizures, detentions and convictions without trial, a high rate of unemployment,
the skyrocketing cost of living and an appalling health situation’.
What can be learned from these three cases? First and foremost, Stroessnismo and the
Tunisian case provide further validity to the theoretical framework, showing how autocrats ruling
for decades organize the state and compel potential rivals to join the regime. Both Stroessner and
Ben Ali credibly shared their power with potential rivals and arranged elections to demonstrate
their invincibility. The Liberian case, on the contrary, illustrates that coup makers need not
always belong to the elite affected by legislatures, parties and elections. The indigenous lower
rank officer Doe was discriminated against based on his ethnicity along with 98.5 % of the
population (see data provided by Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). This finding highlights
the importance of more specific coding rules and the inclusion of information on coup leaders in
future data on overthrows. Second, in addition to the fact that coups are rare events, and thus
almost always unexpected, there are many decisions and events that are too elusive to model in
a global aggregated design. Splits in the ruling factions, rearrangement of military commanders
leading to a powerful general’s grievances and the sitting president’s health in the Stroessner
case, public humiliation and a powerful prime minister with the support of the military in the
Tunisian coup and degree of military defections during riots in the Liberian overthrow. Most
triggering factors of coups are unexpected up until the moment they happen. Similar to war,
the coup attempt may indeed be in the error term (Gartzke 1999). In other words, although
it is possible to identify high risk and low risk countries, unexpected events may lead to coup
attempts in low risk autocracies such as Stroessner’s Paraguay, Bourgiba’s Tunisia and Tolbert’s
Liberia. Many of these events may be unobservable to both participating actors and scholars
ex ante. Interestingly, triggering events are related to institutions under authoritarianism and
intra-regime politics as exemplified by the attempted demotion of Rodr´ıguez in Paraguay for
instance. Quantitative micro-studies similar to those performed by Lyall (2010) and Weidmann
4.2. MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS 51
Table 4.8: Logistic regressions – Model 1 with case indicators included
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4)
Coup attempt Coup attempt Coup attempt Coup attempt
Legislative body in autocracy 0.622∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.591∗
[0.432,0.894] [0.385,0.785] [0.320,0.729] [0.370,0.945]
Coup-initiated regime 1.359 1.274 1.396 1.511
[0.895,2.064] [0.829,1.959] [0.909,2.144] [0.880,2.594]
Regime duration 0.925∗∗∗ 0.952∗∗ 0.974+ 0.973+
[0.895,0.957] [0.924,0.980] [0.949,1.001] [0.943,1.003]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.871 1.056 0.519∗∗∗ 0.742+
[0.717,1.058] [0.830,1.345] [0.404,0.667] [0.532,1.036]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.994 0.991 0.997 0.998
[0.974,1.013] [0.970,1.012] [0.967,1.028] [0.966,1.030]
Previous coup attempt 1.532+ 1.410 1.339 1.113
[0.983,2.389] [0.858,2.318] [0.734,2.442] [0.579,2.138]
Size of largest excluded group (in %) 2.138∗ 1.391
[1.049,4.361] [0.558,3.467]
Infant mortality rate (ln) 2.365∗∗∗ 2.008∗∗
[1.625,3.441] [1.247,3.234]
Civil liberties 0.814∗ 0.809∗
[0.695,0.953] [0.679,0.965]
Observations 3990 3766 2884 2427
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.098 0.098 0.096
LL0 -934.520 -852.116 -583.655 -512.676
LL -855.190 -769.024 -526.356 -463.305
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(2011), or global date specific studies, might illuminate our understanding of institutions under
authoritarianism, intra-regime politics, military-civilian dynamics and coup triggers, and thus
perhaps ultimately improve our predictive models. Third, all cases also contain statements about
structural factors rocking the foundation of these autocracies. Most frequently, the economic
situation is referred to, both in terms of level of development and growth as already included in
the core models, but also regarding inflation and unemployment rates. However, it is unclear
how inflation and unemployment influence both coup attempts and the institutional design of
autocracies. Moreover, corruption is often mentioned, but is likely to have ambiguous effects.
Although often cited as an ex ante reason for an overthrow, regime spoils, as exemplified by
the Paraguayan case, enrich the elite and likely generate further incentives for regime support.
However, civil and political liberties, atrocious health conditions, and, vital in the Liberian coup,
ethnic discrimination are all indicators that can be modeled quantitatively and might correlate
with both the institutional arrangement of autocracies and coup attempts. For instance, civil
liberties might result in demands for representation and implementation of representative bodies.
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Moreover, better living conditions could be argued to shift focus from survival mode to “modern”
values, including demands for freedom, representation and self-fulfillment.
In Table 4.8 I include size of largest excluded group from the Ethnic Power Relations data
set (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010), logged infant mortality rate (World Bank 2010) and
civil liberties (Freedom House 2010) to the core logistic regressions. Because of the varying
temporal and spatial coverage of the variables I have included one model with each of the
variables separately and lastly included them all in one. The odds ratio for “legislative body in
autocracy” is below 1 and significant in all four models. In other words, none of the variables
influence the findings reported in the core models regarding nominally democratic institutions
under authoritarianism. Moreover, size of largest excluded group is significant and positive
as reported in Model C1, meaning that the larger the percentage of the excluded population,
the higher the chances of a coup attempt. However, the improvement in predictive accuracy
with relation to Liberia 1980 is a moderate 0.5 % increase. This is notable because Liberia is
assigned the highest value of exclusion observed in the data set. Additionally, ethnic exclusion
is not significant in Model C4. In Model C2 and C4, the logged infant mortality rate is above 1
and significant, indicating that health conditions may indeed be a concern as many coup makers
claim ex ante. However, the interpretation of the infant mortality rate is ambiguous, as it can
can also be a proxy for level of development. GDP per capita and infant mortality is correlated
at -.73, and the former changes sign in the model C2, indicating that they indeed proxy much
of the same processes. Confusingly, a lower degree of civil liberties (1 = most free, 7 = least
free) decreases the chances of a coup attempt in Model C3 and C4, contradicting the claim by
Okolo (1981) that coup makers often attempt to overthrow repressive regimes to liberate the
population.12
4.3 Summary: Results
An inspection of descriptive statistics and the results of the multivariate analysis indicate that
autocrats ruling with nominally democratic institutions are less likely to be attempted over-
thrown. This provides evidence for both mechanisms theorized in Chapter 2. In autocracies,
the ruling clique can co-opt potential rivals by credibly sharing power through a national legisla-
ture and a support party platform, and deter regime elites from attempting a coup by projecting
strength in elections. However, it remains unclear whether a party platform in addition to a
legislative body is vital for a credible power-sharing relationship. Similarly, autocrats arranging
elections and winning them confidently are not less likely to be attempted overthrown than auto-
crats allowing a legislature filled with non-elective partisan or non-partisan members. Moreover,
coup makers can create a one party support platform in the aftermath of a coup to secure their
grip on power and effectively co-opt potential counter-coup rivals. The results hold for two
12The results are similar with the Freedom House political rights indicator and if a squared term is included.
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different operationalizations of coups and across six operationalizations of institutionalization
of autocracies. Finally, I find no evidence that coup attempts are more likely to succeed in
autocracies without nominally democratic institutions.
A further inspection of the predictive accuracy of the models provides two key insights. First,
the dichotomous variable identifying autocracies with a legislative body in the preferred model
improves the predictive accuracy of coups both in-sample and out-of-sample. Graphing the
ROC-curve in-sample shows that the AUC is significantly increased and, overall, the percentage
of true positives increases while the percentage of false positives simultaneously decreases in the
out-of-sample prediction. Second, no first coups are satisfactorily predicted by the preferred
model demonstrating how elusive these events are. Subsequent events, on the other hand, are
much better predicted, indicating that the model identifies what scholars have labeled a “coup
trap” (Londregan and Poole 1990; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2005). Coups seem to breed coups and
trap countries in a spiral of attempted overthrows.
An inspection of three cases poorly predicted by the preferred model finds both evidence
for and objections to the theoretical propositions of this paper. Stroessner in Paraguay and
Ben Ali in Tunisia maneuvered the regime elites in manners very similar to the ones depicted
in Chapter 2. The Liberian coup in 1980, on the other hand, illustrates that low rank officers
that are unlikely to gain much from nominally democratic institutions can be coup leaders.
This means that although focusing on coups is more accurate regarding the theories of elite
co-optation and deterrence, the approach is not flawless. Coup attempts, although a more
homogenous group than regime breakdowns, can involve a number of different actors. Another
likely explanation of the model’s poor predictive accuracy in these cases is that the triggering
factors are ex ante unidentifiable or difficult to model in a global aggregated study. Quantitative
micro-studies on particular events might however illuminate our understanding of institutions
under authoritarianism, intra-regime politics, military-civilian dynamics and coup triggers, and
thus perhaps ultimately improve our predictive models. Also, identifying the coup leaders, their
characteristics and tactics could positively contribute to the literature.
Lastly, possible structural factors identified through an inspection of the three cases were
utilized as a first test of the robustness of the relationship between institutions under authori-
tarianism and coup attempts. The results hold when including size of largest excluded group,
logged infant mortality rate and the Freedom House civil liberties index. In the next chapter, I
turn to more extensive robustness tests and model diagnostics.
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Chapter 5
Model Robustness and Diagnostics
In order to make sure that the results of the core models presented above are not due to model
(mis)specification, influential observations, omission of relevant variables, idiosyncratic parts of
the dataset or the choice of operationalization of autocracies (and consequentially regime type),
I perform a series of model robustness and diagnostics tests. In order to be valid, the results
should be “robust” (stable) to model adjustments. It should be noted that the twelve models
specified above represent twelve model specifications that provide evidence for the theory of elite
deterrence and co-optation. Specifically, Models 1-12 use six different operationalizations of the
authoritarian regimes expected to be the least likely to be attempted overthrown, and two differ-
ent operationalizations of the independent variable, namely both coup attempts and successful
coups. Regardless of operationalization of both institutional structure and coup attempts, all
results are significant and thus provides strong evidence for the theoretically proposed relation-
ship between institutions under authoritarianism and coup attempts. All additional tests are
performed on Models 1-12, and I report the results for Models 1,2, 7, 8 11 and 12 since they
correspond to the results of the other models.1
5.1 Model Specification
When specifying a statistical model, a number of underlying assumptions are made. It is crucial
to be certain that these underlying assumptions do not affect the results of the analysis. One
of the assumptions made when specifying a logistic model is that the relationship between the
independent variables and logistic form of the dependent variable is linear. In order to check
that the assumed functional form of the relationship between the variables is viable, I perform a
“linktest” (Xiao Chen and Wells N.d.). Specifically, the “linktest” utilizes the predicted values
and the squared predicted values from the original model in a new model. If the predicted
values are significantly related to Y, and the squared predicted values are not, then the model is
assumed to have proper fit. The results from the “linktest” indicate that all models estimated
1In the one case where the results do not correspond, additional results are referred to in Appendix 2.
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at coup attempts are correctly specified. In other words, the predicted values are significant
while the squared predicted values are not. The results are more uncertain when modeling
successful coups, however, indicating that the logistic link function may be inappropriate in
Models 2,4,6,8,10 and 12. Further testing shows that omitting the logged GDP per capita
improves the fit of the models dramatically. For instance, in Model 2, the coefficient of the
predicted values is -.60 with a p-value of .59. After fitting the model without GDP per capita
the predicted values coefficient changes to 2.22 with a p-value of .02. Presumably, these numbers
indicate that expecting a linear relationship between logged income per citizen and the logistic
form of coups is unsuitable.2 The omission of GDP per capita does not affect any of the
substantive findings estimated by the models.
In sum, the fit for models estimated on coup attempts is satisfactory, while the fit for
the successful coup models is not. In all likelihood, this is because the assumed relationship
between GDP per capita and successful coups is inappropriate. However, GDP per capita is
not the variable of interest and the results remain unchanged when excluding the variable.
Therefore, although I concede that a non-linear model may be more appropriate for optimizing
fit, I conclude that it is unlikely to change the core findings of the models.
5.2 Influential Observations
Another way to assess the fit of the core models is to look at the residuals. Cases that do not
fit the predicted outcome of the models have large residuals, while well predicted observations
have small residuals (Long and Freese 2006, 145-153). The former observations are outliers, and
possibly influential observations. Hence, it is crucial to ensure that outliers are not driving the
results. I follow Pregibon (1981) and calculate ‘the effect of removing the ith observation on
the entire vector βˆ, which is the counterpart to Cook’s distance for the linear regression model’
(Long and Freese 2006, 151). I regard an outlier as potentially influential if Pregibon’s Cook
statistic is higher than .1. This leaves me with 10 outliers in Model 1. Naturally, these are all
coup attempts that the models do not predict well, among them Liberia 1980 and Tunisia 1987
as the separation plot indicated. Estimating any of the models without all of them does not
alter the results and I therefore conclude that influential observations do not drive the results
of the analysis.
5.3 Omitted Variable Bias
As mentioned above, following Achen (2005) and Schrodt (2010), the models specified above
are intentionally minimalistic. This means that I made a number of choices regarding which
2I attempted to fit the model including a squared GDP per capita term, modeling an inverted U-shaped
relationship (see e.g. Hegre et al. 2001). However, it did not improve the “linktest”.
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Table 5.1: Continent by coup attempts: Autocracies only
Continent No coup Coup attempt Coup Total
Africa 1,866 72 68 2,006
Americas 454 27 37 518
Asia 1,366 27 31 1,424
Europe 443 3 2 448
Total 4,129 129 138 4,396
variables to include in the core models, possibly excluding variables that might significantly
change the results of the analysis. In this section I account for omitted variables bias in two
ways. First, I include three additional variables in Models 1,2, 7, 8 11 and 12 to further test
the robustness of the core findings. Second, I estimate country fixed effects models in order to
allow each country in the dataset to have different intercepts.
The first new variable I include, military expenditure, is theoretically relevant. The variable
has been collected from the national capabilities data set version v 3.02 (Singer, Bremer and
Stuckey 1972). I include it following Collier and Hoeﬄer (2005, 2006, 2007), finding that strong
militaries might extort the state by threatening a coup d’etat if the state does not redistribute
a large proportion of the GDP to the military. As explained in Collier and Hoeﬄer (2006,
3), the military ‘is both a defender of the government against external threats and internal
rebellions, and itself a source of threat’. If the generals are not satisfied with their payroll
and the resources made available to them, they have the power to attempt an overthrow of
the incumbents. Moreover, regarding institutional design, it might be argued that a state that
spends vast amounts on the military must increase taxes. Increased taxes may produce pressure
from the elites for representation and policy influence resulting in the establishment of nominally
democratic institutions. Hence, military spending might be argued to both affect the dependent
variable and the main explanatory variables, resulting in omitted variable bias. Moreover, in
addition to the minimalist argument, another reason why I chose to exclude the variable from
the core analysis was because of its limited temporal coverage, 1950–2000.
Furthermore, region and decade dummies are included to account for possible dependent
observations and idiosyncrasies in the data set. Remember that the possibility of dependent
variables was modeled by including regime duration, the coup history dummy and by clustering
errors on countries in the core models. I have also clustered the errors by regime type, and the
results remain unchanged. By including decade- and region-specific dummies, I further control
for unmodeled events. For instance, coup attempts are rare occurrences in the 2000’s, while
they proliferated in the 50’s, 60’s and 70’s. Including dummies for each decade is an attempt at
modeling characteristics specific to these decades that might affect the results of the statistical
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Table 5.2: Robustness 1: Military spending, region and decade added to core models
(R1) (R2) (R7) (R8) (R11) (R12)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
Legislative body in autocracy 0.602∗ 0.525∗
[0.407,0.890] [0.318,0.865]
One-party autocracy 0.705+ 0.599∗
[0.484,1.028] [0.366,0.981]
Multiparty autocracy 0.702 0.696
[0.431,1.142] [0.398,1.220]
Coup-initiated autocracy 0.927 1.036 0.959 1.081 1.345 1.569
[0.568,1.514] [0.523,2.055] [0.589,1.559] [0.547,2.136] [0.786,2.302] [0.756,3.258]
Creation of one party in autocracy 1.460 1.510
[0.802,2.660] [0.695,3.279]
Coup-initiated * Creation of one party 0.357∗ 0.304∗
[0.158,0.802] [0.118,0.783]
Regime duration 0.948∗∗∗ 0.982 0.942∗∗∗ 0.975 0.944∗∗∗ 0.976
[0.918,0.978] [0.945,1.020] [0.913,0.971] [0.940,1.011] [0.916,0.972] [0.942,1.012]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.893 0.800 0.887 0.797 0.873 0.786
[0.713,1.118] [0.562,1.138] [0.705,1.117] [0.554,1.146] [0.688,1.108] [0.540,1.146]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.994 0.990 0.994 0.990 0.993 0.990
[0.972,1.015] [0.962,1.019] [0.972,1.016] [0.962,1.019] [0.972,1.015] [0.962,1.019]
Previous coup attempt 2.218∗∗ 1.729 2.291∗∗ 1.800+ 2.394∗∗ 1.961∗
[1.256,3.917] [0.868,3.443] [1.296,4.049] [0.908,3.570] [1.370,4.184] [1.000,3.843]
Logged military spending (t-1) 0.890∗ 0.865∗ 0.895∗ 0.870∗ 0.885∗ 0.860∗
[0.808,0.979] [0.772,0.970] [0.812,0.987] [0.777,0.975] [0.803,0.975] [0.765,0.968]
Africa (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat)
Americas 1.563+ 1.927∗ 1.567+ 1.873∗ 1.537 1.878+
[0.949,2.572] [1.035,3.588] [0.962,2.553] [1.003,3.499] [0.906,2.609] [0.951,3.711]
Asia 0.929 1.049 0.905 0.995 0.962 1.110
[0.561,1.536] [0.594,1.854] [0.547,1.498] [0.566,1.750] [0.585,1.583] [0.642,1.922]
Europe 0.498 0.399 0.485 0.389 0.510 0.406
[0.136,1.829] [0.094,1.699] [0.130,1.805] [0.089,1.691] [0.138,1.876] [0.095,1.745]
1950’s (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat)
1960’s 0.865 1.057 0.866 1.046 0.842 1.006
[0.534,1.401] [0.570,1.959] [0.538,1.394] [0.580,1.888] [0.528,1.341] [0.557,1.817]
1970’s 0.813 0.846 0.843 0.877 0.836 0.863
[0.524,1.263] [0.441,1.624] [0.542,1.309] [0.468,1.645] [0.546,1.281] [0.472,1.576]
1980’s 0.603+ 0.635 0.614 0.654 0.614+ 0.645
[0.339,1.071] [0.289,1.395] [0.342,1.103] [0.299,1.433] [0.347,1.089] [0.299,1.393]
1990’s 0.570+ 0.444+ 0.565+ 0.428+ 0.548∗ 0.418∗
[0.314,1.032] [0.188,1.050] [0.311,1.028] [0.180,1.020] [0.309,0.971] [0.185,0.947]
2000’s 0.711 (omitted) 0.703 (omitted) 0.640 (omitted)
[0.235,2.157] [0.234,2.114] [0.215,1.905]
Observations 3657 3581 3657 3581 3657 3581
Pseudo R2 0.101 0.094 0.098 0.090 0.102 0.093
LL0 -890.952 -558.673 -890.952 -558.673 -890.952 -558.673
LL -800.673 -506.194 -803.295 -508.462 -800.242 -506.689
Logistic regressions; Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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analysis. Also, as shown in Table 5.1, African and Latin-American autocracies have experienced
disproportionately many coup attempts as compared to other regions. Europe, by contrast, is
by far the least coup-prone region.3 The regional-specific differences indicate that failure to
model them might lead to biased estimates.
As can be seen in Table 5.2, the core findings are robust to the inclusion of military expendi-
ture, region and decade variables. First, note that the number of observations drops from 4396
to 3657 and 3581 due to the fact that the military expenditure variable is limited to 1950–2000.4
Starting at Model R1 and R2, the estimates show that autocracies with a legislative body are less
likely to be both attempted and actually overthrown through a coup further confirming H1. The
same is true of H2 and H4. As an exception, autocracies displaying strength through elections
lose significance in the model estimated on successful coups.5 In Model R7 and R8, however, the
estimates are significant for one-party autocracies but not for multiparty autocracies (p-value of
.15 and .20), indicating that the evidence for H2b, and hence H4b, is tentative. This might be
due to a risk involved in opening up for multiple parties, a risk that is contained in one-party
autocracies. More parties may indeed mean less control and an increased number of possible
coup plotters. However, the estimates are negative and in no-man’s-land with regard to level of
significance, making both confirmation or rejection difficult. H2a, that one-party autocracies are
less likely to be attempted overthrown, is however still supported. Moreover, Models R11 and
R12 support H6 while H5 is rejected in all robustness tests. Indeed, coup makers that create a
support party platform are less likely to be attempted overthrown. Coup-initiated autocracies
however, do not seem to be more likely to be attempted couped in any of the robustness tests.
Concerning the controls, durable regimes are less likely to be attempted overthrown in Model
R1, R7 and R11, while coup attempts are more likely in countries with a history of overthrows
in all but Model R2. Furthermore, GDP per capita and GDP growth are not significant in either
of the models. Finally, the more money devoted to the military, the less likely a coup attempt
is. This finding in is line with the argument put forth by Collier and Hoeﬄer (2007), that the
military can be bribed into supporting the current ruling clique.
The fixed effects estimation, as mentioned above, allows a unique intercept for each country.
In essence, it includes dummy variables for each country in the data set. This effectively removes
all countries that do not vary on the variables included in the models (Kennedy 2008, 283). Since
many autocracies are not subjected to coup attempts and/or do not change the institutional
framework during the inspected time period, the number of observations is therefore drastically
reduced. The number of observations drops from 4396 to 2948 in the models estimated on coup
attempts and 2280 in the models estimated on successful coups. Thus, these models estimate
the effect of two different institutional arrangements in the same country at different points
3Since no countries in Oceania are autocratic in the period, the region is omitted from Table 5.1.
4The results are the same with and without this variable, as can be seen in Table 4 in Appendix 2.
5The results are displayed in Table 5 in Appendix 2.
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Table 5.3: Logistic regressions – Country fixed-effects
(FE1) (FE2) (FE3) (FE4) (FE5) (FE6)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
Legislative body in autocracy 0.673∗ 0.466∗∗
[0.481,0.942] [0.291,0.747]
One-party autocracy 0.690+ 0.541∗
[0.461,1.032] [0.303,0.967]
Multiparty autocracy 0.848 0.600+
[0.585,1.229] [0.358,1.007]
Coup-initiated autocracy 1.001 0.355∗∗ 1.082 0.402∗∗ 1.578+ 0.582
[0.620,1.619] [0.181,0.697] [0.673,1.738] [0.207,0.783] [0.925,2.692] [0.286,1.186]
Creation of one party in autocracy 1.385 0.751
[0.767,2.503] [0.317,1.777]
Coup-intiated * Creation of one party 0.374∗∗ 0.406+
[0.181,0.771] [0.142,1.164]
Regime duration 0.974+ 1.032 0.972+ 1.025 0.974+ 1.033+
[0.947,1.003] [0.994,1.073] [0.945,1.001] [0.987,1.065] [0.947,1.003] [0.994,1.072]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.505∗ 0.676 0.488∗∗ 0.647 0.473∗∗ 0.626
[0.300,0.851] [0.323,1.417] [0.290,0.822] [0.311,1.344] [0.281,0.794] [0.304,1.288]
GDP growth (t-1) 1.001 0.997 1.001 0.997 1.001 0.998
[0.982,1.021] [0.970,1.025] [0.982,1.021] [0.969,1.026] [0.982,1.021] [0.970,1.026]
Previous coup attempt 0.694 0.775 0.675 0.779 0.655+ 0.875
[0.431,1.117] [0.377,1.595] [0.416,1.095] [0.373,1.628] [0.399,1.077] [0.422,1.812]
Observations 2948 2280 2948 2280 2948 2280
LL0 -706.296 -406.350 -706.296 -406.350 -706.296 -406.350
LL -692.833 -391.741 -693.841 -393.920 -690.012 -388.826
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
in time. In other words, “fixing” the effects by country is an attempt at removing country-
specific differences. Fixed effects estimation is therefore often referred to as within-group effects
estimation, as opposed to between-group estimation (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008). The
procedure is analogous to including region and decade dummies.
Table 5.3 shows that the core results hold. Autocracies with a legislative body are less likely
than other autocracies to be both attempted and successfully overthrown. Moreover, similar
to Table 5.2, estimates are more uncertain when disaggregating on number of parties in the
legislature. Both estimates for one party autocracies are significant at the .1 level, while only
the estimate in Model FE4 is significant for multiple party autocracies. In other words, in the
fixed effects model, multiple party autocracies are not less likely than no-party autocracies with
or without a legislature to be attempted overthrown, but they are less likely to be successfully
unseated. The estimates for coup-initiated autocracies vary from model to model. In fact,
estimates are below 1 and significant in Model FE2 and FE4, and above 1 and significant in
Model FE5. The former results contradict the core analysis in which the results indicated that
coup-initiated autocracies have a higher probability of being successfully overthrown. Most
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likely, these results illustrate the fact that some countries are continually subjected to coups
and drive the results in the core analysis. When fixing the effect for each country, unobserved
country-specific reasons for the cycle of overthrows are eliminated. Syria, Bolivia, Benin, Burkina
Faso and Haiti all experienced 5 or more successful coups between 1950–2008. These countries
are subjected to 23 % of the successful coups in autocracies in the period and therefore possibly
drive the effect of coup-initiated regimes on successful coups in the core analysis.6 In the models
estimating the probability of coup attempts, however, the results are similar to those in the core
regressions. Moreover, Model FE5 and FE6 show once again that coup-initiated autocracies in
which the ruling clique establishes a one party support platform are less likely to be subjected
to both coup attempts and successful coups.
In sum, although two of the models, FE2 and FE4, contradict the finding that coup-initiated
autocracies are more likely to be subjected to a coup, the core findings are robust and not likely
to be the result of omitted variable bias. Incumbents in autocracies ruling with nominally
democratic institutions are indeed less likely to be attempted overthrown.
5.4 Alternative Operationalization of Autocracy
In the conflict and democratization literature there is currently no consensus regarding the defin-
ing traits of autocracies and democracies. Hence, there are several different operationalizations
available to scholars. Robust findings should not be affected by choice of operationalization. In
order to ensure that the results of the core models are robust I created a second data set with
all operationalizations based on a dichotomization of the Polity scale.
The Polity index is a continuous measure of autocracies and democracies provided by Mar-
shall, Gurr and Jaggers (2010). It classifies countries on a scale from -10 to +10, where -10 is a
closed and tightly controlled autocracy like Saudi Arabia (1950–2008) or Haiti (1971–1976). +10
represents a liberal democracy such as present-day Sweden or New Zealand. The conception
of democracy is funded upon an effort to incorporate additional aspects beyond the minimalis-
tic ACLP dichotomization. Instead of solely considering whether the legislative and executive
branches are filled through competitive elections, the Polity index also focuses on institutional
constraints and participation rates, which no doubt adds vital information about the nature of
regimes.
Many research questions in the democratization literature, like the one asked in this thesis,
concern whether a country is autocratic or not. Whereas the ACLP dichotomization considers
regimes to be types (autocracies or democracies), the Polity index treats regimes like variations
on a theme (3 out of 21 or 15 out of 21). In order to investigate the research question at hand
then, it is necessary to dichotomize the scale. As shown in Figure 5.1 the scale is clearly bimodal.
Only 17 % of the regimes from 1950-2008 scored between -4 and +4. The fact that the scale is
6Syria, Bolivia, Benin, Burkina Faso and Haiti make up 32 of 138 successful coups in autocracies 1950–2008.
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bimodal makes choosing a cut off point easier, and less controversial. I will be using the most
common one, setting the bar for being classified as a democracy at a relatively high level, coding
all regimes scoring +5 and below as autocracies (Bogaards 2011, 7). Although the cutoff point
is arbitrary and therefore may be criticized (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010; Bogaards
2011), there are three notable advantages to this approach. First, it classifies most of the more
ambiguous and often controversial cases in the middle of the scale as autocracies. Secondly,
as mentioned above, by dichotomizing the Polity scale in addition to utilizing the classification
provided by Przeworski et al. (2000), I can test the robustness of the findings with a measure of
regimes that incorporates other vital aspects of democracy in addition to whether elite selection
is contested. Finally, with regard to the theories of elite co-optation and deterrence, all previous
analyses that I am aware of rest upon the ACLP classification. That may be problematic if a
Polity dichotomization yields different results.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the discrepancies between the original ACLP and the Polity index in
two ambiguous cases, Botswana and Mexico. While the two measures converge around the
time when Vicente Fox won the Mexican 2000 election, Botswana remains an autocracy in
the eyes of the minimalists due to the continued rule of BDP. By contrast, Botswana scores
relatively high on the Polity index (6-8) and thus most scholars preferring it would consider
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Botswana democratic. Although Pemstein, Meserve and Melton (2010) found that the two
different measurements of democracy are mostly in accordance, there are, as illustrated in Table
5.4, numerous ambiguous regimes like the Botswanan that continue to be controversial. In fact,
the dichotomizations differ on 754 country years. 415 autocratic country years according to the
Polity dichotomization are coded as democratic country years by ACLP. Conversely, 339 country
years coded as autocracies by ACLP are coded as democracies by the Polity dichotomization.
This evidence further suggests checking for robustness with an alternative operationalization.
Table 5.5 displays the results using the Polity dichotomization. The core findings are indeed
robust. Autocracies with nominally democratic institutions are less likely to be attempted
overthrown in Model Polity 1,2,7 and 8. However, although the estimates for coup-initiated
autocracies and coup-initiated autocracies creating a support party platform are in the expected
direction, they are not significant at conventional levels. This weakens the finding that coup
makers can create a support party platform in order to co-opt potential rivals in the aftermath
of a successful coup. Moreover, coup-initiated autocracies are only borderline more likely to be
overthrown in one model, namely Polity 12. The estimates for the controls show, similar to Table
5.2, that logged GDP per capita is insignificant. Indeed, it is only significant in the core models,
indicating that coup attempts in autocracies are not necessarily affected by level of economic
Table 5.4: Polity dichotomy by ACLP dichotomy
ACLP dichotomy
Polity dichotomy Autocracy Democracy Total
Autocracy 4,057 415 4,472
Democracy 339 2,433 2,772
Total 4,396 2,848 7,244
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Table 5.5: Robustness 2: Alternative operationalization of autocracy
(Polity 1) (Polity 2) (Polity 7) (Polity 8) (Polity 11) (Polity 12)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
Legislative body in autocracy 0.671∗∗ 0.616∗
[0.498,0.906] [0.422,0.900]
One-party autocracy 0.671∗ 0.540∗∗
[0.491,0.918] [0.363,0.802]
Multiparty autocracy 0.593∗ 0.479∗∗∗
[0.394,0.893] [0.309,0.742]
Coup-initiated autocracy 0.932 1.085 1.053 1.261 1.243 1.516+
[0.647,1.342] [0.705,1.670] [0.751,1.478] [0.848,1.874] [0.833,1.855] [0.941,2.441]
Creation of one party in autocracy 0.955 0.788
[0.552,1.653] [0.362,1.718]
Coup-initiated * Creation of one party 0.596 0.561
[0.284,1.249] [0.217,1.450]
Regime duration 0.922∗∗∗ 0.947∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗
[0.896,0.948] [0.917,0.978] [0.896,0.946] [0.919,0.978] [0.894,0.946] [0.915,0.976]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.902 0.885 0.891 0.865 0.884 0.862
[0.748,1.088] [0.694,1.127] [0.741,1.071] [0.685,1.092] [0.727,1.076] [0.675,1.102]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.990 0.989 0.990 0.988 0.990 0.988
[0.971,1.010] [0.967,1.011] [0.970,1.010] [0.966,1.011] [0.971,1.010] [0.967,1.010]
Previous coup attempt 2.226∗∗∗ 1.643+ 2.102∗∗∗ 1.485 2.320∗∗∗ 1.763∗
[1.455,3.404] [0.983,2.745] [1.391,3.178] [0.898,2.455] [1.516,3.551] [1.051,2.956]
Observations 4472 4472 4472 4472 4472 4472
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.047 0.077 0.054 0.074 0.050
LL0 -1110.748 -686.673 -1110.748 -686.673 -1110.748 -686.673
LL -1028.398 -654.194 -1025.497 -649.537 -1028.130 -652.520
Logistic regressions; Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
development. Regime duration is, on the other hand, quite robust to model specifications.
Finally, previous coup attempt is significant in five of the models. However, as explained above,
the results of the fixed effects estimation indicates that these results might be driven by a small
number of very coup-prone countries.
In sum, the support of both H5 and H6 is dependent upon choice of regime type measure,
while H1, H2, H2a, H2b, H4 and H4b are supported.
5.5 Summary: Model Robustness and Diagnostics
Most results from the core models are statistically robust. However, uncertainty surrounds the
findings concerning multiparty autocracies and coup-initiated autocracies creating a support
party base as indicated in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.5 respectively. As a result, inferences based on
the core models are tentative. Moreover, the assumed functional form in the models fitted on
successful coups may not be satisfactory, but altering the model is unlikely to change the core
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findings relevant to the theoretical framework. Finally, the results are not driven by influential
cases or omitted variable bias. A notable exception is that the estimate for coup-initiated
autocracies is significant in the opposite direction in two of the country fixed effects models.
This is likely due to the fact that a few countries have been subjected to a disproportionate
amount of successful coups. In sum however, the model diagnostics suggest that institutionalized
autocracies are less likely to be attempted overthrown. Indeed, nominally democratic institutions
are not mere window-dressing nor necessarily liberalizing policies, but can be pillars of stability.
This is in line with previous research illustrating that institutionalized autocracies are less likely
to break down, and warrants further research on the intra-regime politics of autocracies.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
I opened with the question: why do autocrats allow legislatures, parties and elections? In the
foregoing I have proposed that these nominally democratic institutions help shape outcomes in
authoritarian regimes. They contribute to co-optation and deterrence of potential rival elites
in autocracies, and thus lower the risk of coup attempts. I identify two mechanisms through
which these institutions work. First, legislatures and parties establish a credible power-sharing
relationship with the civilian and military elites. Legislatures and parties commit the ruling
clique to not abuse their superior position by institutionalizing some power in the hands of
a broadened group of elite citizens. By sharing power in a credible way, trust is established
between the ruling clique and a larger number of influential elites in an environment normally
characterized by secrecy and uncertainty. Moreover, legislators and party members are offered
spoils and the possibility to advance in the ranks of the regime. During the Mexican PRI’s rule
for instance, leadership rotation was institutionalized, and distinguished members of the party
were allowed to run for office. These circumstances generated incentives for elites to work in
the interest of the regime rather than attempting to overthrow it. Second, by arranging and
convincingly “winning” elections, autocrats publicly display that they are “the only game in
town”. “Winning” elections by large margins communicate to both the elites and the masses
that the current incumbents are near invincible. Such a display of the ruling clique’s right to
continued rule reinforces the perception that the regime is likely to last into the future. Moreover,
elections can also help the ruling clique identify popular opposition candidates and then decide
how to react. Potential rivals are thus deterred from attempting a coup against people who
provide them with riches and influence.
Previous research on elite co-optation and deterrence has focused on regime breakdowns, a
heterogenous group of events that can involve coups, revolutions, civil wars, democratization
or mere changes to the institutional framework. The complexity of the events and numerous
actors involved in regime breakdowns make it hard to know whether the outcome is driven by
potential rivals within the regime elite or other actors such as the masses, foreign interventionists
or rebel groups. By narrowing the focus to coup attempts, a form of anti-regime activity that
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is more closely connected to regime elites, be it civilian or military, the outcome group is not
only more homogenous but also more in tune with the proposed theoretical mechanisms. In
fact, the definition of a coup attempt involves that the attempted overthrow is performed by
members of the state apparatus, most often the elite. Additionally, merely focusing on actual
breakdowns is inaccurate, because a regime in which the incumbents are continually subjected
to unsuccessful coups is undoubtedly weaker than autocracies in which incumbents are not. By
ignoring unsuccessful coups that do not result in a regime breakdown, valuable information is
discarded.
In accordance with previous research addressing regime longevity, I find that autocrats rul-
ing with nominally democratic institutions are less likely to be subjected to both coup attempts
and successful coups. The findings provide evidence for the proposed theoretical relationship
in which authoritarian leaders credibly share their power with potential rivals in a legislature,
a regime support party and display strength through elections. I suggest that the existence
of nominally democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes are not compromising nor nec-
essarily liberalizing policies inevitably leading to regime breakdown or conflict. Rather, they
are often pillars of stability. These institutions deter and co-opt potential rivals and compel
them to support the regime in return for power, stability, spoils and the promise of potential
future promotions. I find however, no evidence that institutional differences between autocracies
with some variant of nominally democratic institutions in place differ in their propensity to be
subjected to coup attempts. Parties and elections may thus not be “necessary”. On that note,
it should be mentioned that most autocracies allowing a national legislature also allow parties.
Moreover, extensive robustness tests reveal that the evidence is tentative for multiple party au-
tocracies, indicating that allowing more than one official party can involve risk. If parties are
potential launching pads for rivaling elites, then more parties means a higher number of popular
rivals. Also, support for the hypothesis that coup-initiated autocracies establishing a party sup-
port basis in the legislature are less likely to be attempted overthrown hinges on the choice of
operationalization of regime type. In addition, durable regimes are less likely to be subjected to
coup attempts while level of income fails to be significant in several robustness tests, and thus
the evidence for a relationship between economic development and coup attempts in autocracies
is tentative. Interestingly, country fixed-effects reveal that the coup-trap effect may be driven by
a small number of countries continually subjected to coup attempts. Finally, I find no evidence
that economic growth affects the probability of attempted overthrows.
Regarding the predictive accuracy of the models presented in this thesis, several notable
patterns are revealed. First and foremost, both in-sample and out-of-sample tests indicate that
the institutional variables utilized moderately increases the predictive power of the models. In
all likelihood, the increase is moderate because an aggregated country-year study in combination
with dummy variables to identify the institutional design of autocracies is too crude a tool to
capture the subtlety of many of the theoretical mechanisms. One possible remedy could be to
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follow the civil war literature by gradually moving away from the country-year setup and focus
on date specific events. Such an approach would require extensive data collection on institutional
changes. Second, the separation plots reveal that none of the first coup attempts were satisfacto-
rily predicted by the models. This finding underlines the elusive nature of first events. Moreover,
more proximate coup triggers may better anticipate the events that the models presented in this
thesis fail to anticipate. Quantitative event- and country-specific studies can provide valuable
insights into triggering events, the functions of institutions under authoritarianism, legislative
and party representatives’ behavior and the crucial role of civilian-military relations. Third,
the case studies enhance both strengths and weaknesses of the theoretical framework and the
data utilized. Stroessner in Paraguay and Ben Ali in Tunisia are examples of how autocrats
credibly share their powers, form alliances, share regime spoils and hold elections to legitimize
their stay in office. The overthrow in Liberia, on the contrary, illustrates that not all coup
attempts are lead by elites that can benefit from nominally democratic institutions. Like the
overwhelming majority of the population, the low rank officer Doe was marginalized because of
his ethnic background. Regardless, the Master Sergeant managed to topple President Tolbert
in a bloody coup. To help illuminate the link between nominally democratic institutions under
authoritarianism, elite co-optation and deterrence, data on the tactics of the perpetrators, for
instance whether the coup was bloody or not coupled with background information on the coup
maker could be collected.
In conclusion, the results strengthen the claim that institutions under authoritarianism are
effective tools for co-optation and deterrence of regime elites. It is clear that the institutional
characteristics of autocracies matter for the propensity to be subjected to a coup attempt and
should therefore be further scrutinized, especially whether differences in institutional design
matters. Moreover, the approach of this thesis underlines that disaggregating regime breakdown
and concentrating on more homogenous events such as popular revolutions or coup attempts is
a fruitful endeavor in order to more accurately test complex theories.
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Appendix 1: Coding coup attempts
In some cases there were multiple coup attempts in each country year. The observations are
listed below. If there were two successful coups, I recorded it as one successful coup. If there
was one unsuccessful and one successful coup, I recorded it as a successful coup:
Argentina (1955) – two coups
Argentina (1971) – unsuccessful coup and coup
Bangladesh (1975) – two coups
Benin (1965) – two coups
Benin (1972) – unsuccessful coup and coup
Bolivia (1978) – two coups
Brazil (1964) – two coups
Burundi (1966) – two coups
Chile (1973) – unsuccessful coup and coup
Congo (1968) – two coups
Haiti (1957) – three coups
Haiti (1988) – two coups
Honduras (1956) – unsuccessful coup and coup
Iraq (1963) – two coups
Laos (1960) – two coups
Nigeria (1966) - two coups
Sierra Leone (1992) – unsuccessful coup and coup
Suriname (1980) – two coups
Syria (1966) – unsuccessful coup and coup
Thailand (1951) – unsuccessful coup and coup
Vietnam, South (1964) – unsuccessful coup and coup
Vietnam, South (1965) – unsuccessful coup and two coups
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Appendix 2: Additional Results
Table 1: Logistic regressions – Possible type II errors excluded
(Type II 1) (Type II 2) (Type II 7) (Type II 8) (Type II 11) (Type II 12)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
Legislative body in autocracy 0.568∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
[0.408,0.790] [0.322,0.743]
One-party autocracy 0.704∗ 0.589∗
[0.505,0.981] [0.385,0.901]
Multiparty autocracy 0.693+ 0.623∗
[0.451,1.065] [0.394,0.984]
Coup-initiated autocracy 1.261 1.707+ 1.339 1.839∗ 1.868∗∗ 2.662∗∗
[0.848,1.875] [0.949,3.072] [0.898,1.997] [1.023,3.307] [1.175,2.972] [1.336,5.304]
Creation of one party in autocracy 1.243 1.107
[0.709,2.178] [0.506,2.422]
Coup-initiated * Creation of one party 0.434∗ 0.382∗
[0.205,0.916] [0.148,0.986]
Regime duration 0.926∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 0.944∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗
[0.897,0.955] [0.916,0.986] [0.892,0.948] [0.910,0.980] [0.893,0.950] [0.910,0.981]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.820∗ 0.789+ 0.817∗ 0.781+ 0.802∗ 0.768∗
[0.687,0.979] [0.620,1.005] [0.678,0.984] [0.610,1.000] [0.661,0.973] [0.596,0.990]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.992 0.991 0.992 0.991 0.992 0.991
[0.973,1.012] [0.969,1.015] [0.973,1.013] [0.968,1.015] [0.973,1.012] [0.968,1.014]
Previous coup attempt 1.582∗ 0.960 1.650∗ 0.995 1.663∗ 1.063
[1.012,2.474] [0.521,1.770] [1.050,2.591] [0.541,1.827] [1.043,2.652] [0.557,2.030]
Observations 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223 4223
Pseudo R2 0.083 0.062 0.078 0.057 0.081 0.060
LL0 -984.762 -601.034 -984.762 -601.034 -984.762 -601.034
LL -903.352 -563.584 -907.733 -566.663 -905.411 -564.824
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 2: Logistic regressions – Institutional differences
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
Legislative body w/at least one party 1.437 1.789
[0.701,2.944] [0.699,4.575]
Ruling party displays strength 1.044 1.325
[0.718,1.518] [0.726,2.418]
Coup-initiated regime 0.975 1.074 0.983 1.087
[0.560,1.699] [0.520,2.221] [0.565,1.710] [0.528,2.236]
Regime duration 0.949∗∗ 0.976 0.947∗∗ 0.973
[0.917,0.983] [0.935,1.018] [0.914,0.982] [0.932,1.016]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.493∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.495∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗
[0.367,0.661] [0.246,0.530] [0.370,0.663] [0.250,0.534]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.997 0.999 0.997 0.998
[0.969,1.026] [0.962,1.037] [0.968,1.026] [0.961,1.036]
Previous coup attempt 1.719∗ 1.122 1.708∗ 1.137
[1.038,2.846] [0.571,2.206] [1.029,2.836] [0.574,2.249]
Observations 3254 3254 3254 3254
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.068 0.071 0.067
LL0 -568.044 -334.157 -568.044 -334.157
LL -527.402 -311.405 -527.944 -311.675
Autocracies without legislatures are excluded from these regressions.
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3: Logistic regressions – Table 4.4 with no-party autocracy with legislature dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
No-party autocracy 0.427∗ 0.317∗ 0.467+ 0.376∗
[0.193,0.947] [0.126,0.800] [0.208,1.047] [0.149,0.949]
One-party autocracy 0.628∗∗ 0.539∗∗
[0.441,0.893] [0.347,0.838]
Multiparty autocracy 0.595∗ 0.518∗∗
[0.388,0.912] [0.324,0.827]
One-party autocracy displaying strength 0.705∗ 0.664+
[0.506,0.983] [0.438,1.008]
Multiparty autocracy displaying strength 0.542∗ 0.560∗
[0.333,0.883] [0.319,0.985]
Coup-initiated regime 1.290 1.571 1.349 1.689+
[0.872,1.908] [0.879,2.807] [0.921,1.978] [0.954,2.990]
Regime duration 0.929∗∗∗ 0.955∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.954∗
[0.901,0.957] [0.922,0.990] [0.901,0.958] [0.921,0.989]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.807∗ 0.766∗ 0.813∗ 0.770∗
[0.673,0.968] [0.597,0.983] [0.675,0.978] [0.596,0.996]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.994 0.993 0.994 0.993
[0.974,1.013] [0.970,1.016] [0.975,1.014] [0.971,1.017]
Previous coup attempt 1.651∗ 1.126 1.644∗ 1.142
[1.063,2.563] [0.616,2.059] [1.066,2.536] [0.627,2.080]
Observations 4396 4396 4396 4396
Pseudo R2 0.082 0.061 0.082 0.058
LL0 -1006.643 -613.456 -1006.643 -613.456
LL -924.332 -576.135 -924.114 -578.156
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4: Logistic regressions – Table 5.2 without military spending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
Legislative body in autocracy 0.622∗ 0.560∗
[0.425,0.911] [0.349,0.898]
One-party autocracy 0.731+ 0.624∗
[0.516,1.035] [0.390,0.999]
Multiparty autocracy 0.800 0.774
[0.507,1.262] [0.456,1.312]
Coup-initiated autocracy 1.025 1.213 1.059 1.255 1.460 1.760
[0.641,1.639] [0.621,2.370] [0.667,1.682] [0.649,2.428] [0.883,2.412] [0.866,3.574]
Creation of one party in autocracy 1.416 1.270
[0.826,2.428] [0.594,2.714]
Coup-initiated * Creation of one party 0.419∗ 0.378∗
[0.203,0.865] [0.152,0.939]
Regime duration 0.949∗∗∗ 0.984 0.944∗∗∗ 0.979 0.945∗∗∗ 0.980
[0.922,0.976] [0.951,1.019] [0.918,0.970] [0.947,1.012] [0.920,0.972] [0.948,1.012]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.767∗ 0.696∗ 0.760∗ 0.688∗ 0.745∗∗ 0.677∗
[0.627,0.939] [0.508,0.952] [0.614,0.942] [0.496,0.955] [0.600,0.926] [0.485,0.945]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.993 0.990 0.993 0.990 0.993 0.991
[0.973,1.014] [0.964,1.017] [0.973,1.014] [0.964,1.017] [0.973,1.014] [0.965,1.018]
Previous coup attempt 2.102∗∗ 1.578 2.206∗∗ 1.655 2.206∗∗ 1.752
[1.227,3.601] [0.790,3.151] [1.291,3.769] [0.838,3.271] [1.290,3.773] [0.884,3.474]
Africa (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat)
Americas 1.566+ 1.902∗ 1.561+ 1.855+ 1.545 1.885+
[0.944,2.596] [1.014,3.570] [0.949,2.567] [0.992,3.470] [0.916,2.605] [0.966,3.678]
Asia 0.740 0.808 0.733 0.786 0.746 0.836
[0.481,1.139] [0.498,1.311] [0.476,1.129] [0.491,1.257] [0.484,1.150] [0.524,1.333]
Europe 0.396 0.289+ 0.396 0.294+ 0.400 0.288+
[0.114,1.367] [0.069,1.216] [0.113,1.384] [0.069,1.259] [0.115,1.390] [0.068,1.215]
1950’s (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat)
1960’s 0.893 1.147 0.895 1.144 0.872 1.093
[0.537,1.484] [0.629,2.092] [0.542,1.478] [0.639,2.051] [0.533,1.425] [0.613,1.949]
1970’s 0.787 0.834 0.825 0.876 0.804 0.843
[0.507,1.221] [0.443,1.573] [0.533,1.276] [0.473,1.623] [0.525,1.231] [0.469,1.514]
1980’s 0.549∗ 0.550 0.566∗ 0.577 0.546∗ 0.555
[0.328,0.917] [0.268,1.130] [0.332,0.962] [0.279,1.193] [0.325,0.920] [0.273,1.130]
1990’s 0.502∗ 0.404∗ 0.492∗ 0.392∗ 0.485∗∗ 0.387∗
[0.295,0.853] [0.183,0.890] [0.283,0.857] [0.175,0.875] [0.285,0.825] [0.179,0.834]
2000’s 0.291∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
[0.134,0.632] [0.021,0.383] [0.127,0.582] [0.019,0.347] [0.122,0.546] [0.019,0.336]
Observations 4396 4396 4396 4396 4396 4396
Pseudo R2 0.104 0.102 0.101 0.099 0.104 0.102
LL0 -1006.643 -613.456 -1006.643 -613.456 -1006.643 -613.456
LL -901.606 -550.664 -904.913 -552.752 -902.200 -550.969
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 5: Logistic regressions – Table 5.2 on H2 and H4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coup attempt Coup Coup attempt Coup
Legislative body w/at least one party 0.706+ 0.662+
[0.493,1.010] [0.421,1.043]
Ruling party displays strength 0.740+ 0.713
[0.518,1.056] [0.445,1.142]
Coup-initiated regime 1.017 1.094 1.024 1.100
[0.636,1.625] [0.553,2.163] [0.638,1.644] [0.555,2.177]
Regime duration 0.942∗∗∗ 0.976 0.943∗∗∗ 0.976
[0.914,0.972] [0.940,1.012] [0.914,0.973] [0.941,1.013]
Logged GDP per capita (t-1) 0.888 0.803 0.884 0.796
[0.706,1.117] [0.562,1.148] [0.700,1.117] [0.553,1.146]
GDP growth (t-1) 0.994 0.991 0.994 0.992
[0.972,1.016] [0.964,1.020] [0.972,1.016] [0.964,1.020]
Previous coup attempt 2.192∗∗ 1.821+ 2.237∗∗ 1.879+
[1.252,3.837] [0.921,3.602] [1.281,3.909] [0.957,3.689]
Military spending (t-1) 0.896∗ 0.863∗ 0.896∗ 0.864∗
[0.815,0.985] [0.771,0.965] [0.815,0.985] [0.772,0.968]
Africa (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat)
Americas 1.557+ 1.933∗ 1.548+ 1.920∗
[0.949,2.555] [1.038,3.600] [0.944,2.540] [1.032,3.574]
Asia 0.901 1.036 0.897 1.030
[0.543,1.497] [0.587,1.830] [0.536,1.500] [0.586,1.812]
Europe 0.482 0.393 0.488 0.399
[0.130,1.787] [0.091,1.693] [0.132,1.800] [0.093,1.713]
1950’s (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat) (ref. cat)
1960’s 0.864 1.048 0.872 1.058
[0.537,1.390] [0.578,1.899] [0.542,1.403] [0.580,1.928]
1970’s 0.837 0.859 0.851 0.875
[0.539,1.300] [0.455,1.621] [0.549,1.320] [0.460,1.664]
1980’s 0.612+ 0.657 0.611 0.653
[0.343,1.091] [0.300,1.438] [0.339,1.099] [0.294,1.452]
1990’s 0.568+ 0.480+ 0.545∗ 0.457+
[0.314,1.026] [0.206,1.120] [0.305,0.974] [0.199,1.050]
2000’s 0.705 0.666
[0.235,2.115] [0.221,2.006]
Observations 3657 3581 3657 3581
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.088 0.098 0.087
LL0 -890.952 -558.673 -890.952 -558.673
LL -803.315 -509.519 -804.033 -510.262
Exponentiated coefficients; 95% confidence intervals in brackets
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix 3: Stata syntax
The syntax below produces all figures and tables included in the thesis in Stata. Most figures








/*Label variables of interest*/
lab var coupsuc "Successful coup"
lab var coup2 "Coup attempt"
lab var coupunsuc "Unsuccessful coup attempt"
lab var strength "Ruling party displays strength"
lab var legpartyaut "Legislative body w/at least one party"
lab var legdum "Legislative body"
lab var onepartylp "One-party autocracy"
lab var mpartylp "Multiparty autocracy"
lab var onepartystr "One-party autocracy displaying strength"
lab var mpartystr "Multiparty autocracy displaying strength"
lab var prevcatt2 "Previous coup attempt"
lab var regdurspec "Regime duration"
lab var l2_logmadgdpc "GDP per capita"
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lab var l2_madgrpercent "GDP growth"
lab var coupinit2 "Coup-initiated regime"
lab var createaut "Creation of one party in autocracy"
lab var openaut "Opening for multiple parties in autocracy"
gen sample=1 if leg!=. & legpartyaut!=. & strength!=. & coupinit2!=. ///
& l2_logmadgdpc!=. & l2_madgrpercent!=. & prevcatt2!=. & chga_demo==0
gen sampledem=1 if leg!=. & legpartyaut!=. & strength!=. & coupinit2!=. ///







/*Figure 4.1 Coup attempts: 1950--2008*/
bysort year: egen nrcoupsyear=total(coupsuc)
bysort year: egen totalcoupyear=total(coup2)
lab var totalcoupyear "Coup attempts"
lab var nrcoupsyear "Coups"
gen relcoups=totalcoupyear/nrcountries
lab var relcoups "Coup attempts"
gen relcoupsucs=nrcoupsyear/nrcountries
lab var relcoupsucs "Coups"
twoway ///
(line relcoups year if sample!=.) ///
(line relcoupsucs year if sample!=.) ///
, xlabel(1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008) scheme(vg_s2m) ///
ytitle(Proportion of countries attempted couped)
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/* Figure 4.2 Institutional Design of Regimes 1950--2008*/
bysort year: egen legtotal=sum(legdum)
bysort year: egen demototal=sum(chga_demo)
gen noleg=1 if legdum==0 & chga_demo_l==0
replace noleg=0 if legdum==1 | chga_demo==1




lab var relleg "Autocracy: Legislative body"
lab var relnoleg "Autocracy: No legislature"
lab var reldemo "Democracy"
twoway ///
(line relleg year) ///
(line relnoleg year) ///
(line reldemo year) ///
, xlabel(1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008) ///




local controls regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2 coupinit2
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estsimp logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1 ///
, or cluster(gwno) sims(10000)
/*Expected (mean) values*/
setx mean
simqi, pr /*Expected probability*/
capture drop legis0 legis1
setx mean
setx legdum 0
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr (legis0)
setx mean
setx legdum 1
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr(legis1)
/* Figure 4.3*/
graph box legis0 legis1, scheme(vg_s2m) ///
ytitle(Simulated probability of coup attempt) ///
legend(label (1 No legislature) label(2 Legislature)) ///
marker(2, msize(small)) marker(1, msize(small))
/*Model 8*/
capture drop b1-b7
estsimp logit coupsuc onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ ///




simqi, pr /*Expected probability*/
capture drop legis0 legis1
setx mean
setx onepartylp 0
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr (legis0)
setx mean
setx onepartylp 1
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr(legis1)
capture drop prevcatt0 prevcatt1
setx mean
setx mpartylp 0
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr (legis00)
setx mean
setx mpartylp 1
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr(legis2)
/* Figure 4.4*/
graph box legis0 legis1 legis2, scheme(vg_s2m) ///
ytitle(Simulated probability of successful coup) ///
legend(label (1 No party) label(2 One party) ///
label(3 Multiple parties)) marker(2, msize(small)) ///
marker(1, msize(small)) marker(3, msize(small))
/*Model 12*/
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capture drop b1-b8
/*Controls in macro*/
local controls2 regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2
estsimp logit coupsuc createaut coupinit2 ///
coupinit2_create2 openaut coupinit2_open ///




capture drop legis0 legis1
setx mean
setx coupinit2 0
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr (legis0)
setx mean
setx coupinit2 1
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr(legis1)
capture drop prevcatt0 prevcatt1
setx mean
setx coupinit2_create2 0
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr (prevcatt0)
setx mean
setx coupinit2_create2 1
simqi, prval(1) level(90) genpr(prevcatt1)
/* Figure 4.5*/
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graph box legis1 prevcatt1, scheme(vg_s2m) ///
ytitle(Simulated probability of coup attempt) ///
legend(label (1 Coup-initiated no-party) ///
label(2 Coup-initiated one-party)) ///
marker(2, msize(small)) marker(1, msize(small))
/*Figure 4.6: ROC-curve: Model 1* and Model 1*/








roccomp coup2 p1 p2 if sample==1, graph summary /*Prob>chi2 = 0.0456*/
/*Figure 4.7: Separation plots*/
local controls regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2 coupinit2
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
predict pred_coup2_m2
sort pred_coup2_m2
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gen rank2 = _n
/*First event*/
graph bar firstevent if pred_coup2_m2!=. & sample==1, ///




gen subscoupandatt=1 if coup2==1 & firstevent==0
graph bar subscoupandatt if pred_coup2_m2!=. & sample==1, ///
over(rank2, label(nolabels)) ylabel(none) ytitle("") ///
aspectratio(.05) plotregion(style(none)) ///
yscale(off) graphregion(fcolor(gs15)) scheme(vg_s2m)
/*Figure 5.1 Polity Index Histogram*/
lab var p_polity2 "Polity scale"
hist p_polity2 if sampledem!=., ///
percent title(Polity Index 1950-2008) scheme(vg_s2m)
/*Figure 5.2 Democracies or Autocracies?*/
gen chga_demo_graph=.
replace chga_demo_graph=10 if chga_demo_l==1
replace chga_demo_graph=-10 if chga_demo_l==0
lab var chga_demo_graph "ACLP"
sort gwno year
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graph twoway (line p_polity2 year if country=="Botswana") ///
(line chga_demo_graph year if country=="Botswana"), ///
scheme(vg_s2m) title(Botswana) ///
xlabel(1967 1980 1990 2000 2008)
graph twoway (line p_polity2 year if country=="Mexico") ///
(line chga_demo_graph year if country=="Mexico"), ///
scheme(vg_s2m) title(Mexico) ///






/*Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of variables in model -- Autocracies only*/
*ssc install sutex
sutex coup2 legdum legpartyaut strength onepartylp ///
mpartylp onepartystr mpartystr coupinit2 createaut ///
openaut regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc l2_madgrpercent ///
prevcatt2 if sample!=., labels nobs minmax ///
title(Descriptive statistics of variables in model -- Autocracies only) ///
replace file(Tables/summstat.tex)
/*Table 4.1 Institutional Features and Coup Attempts: Democracies Included (%) */
label define legpartyaut4 0 "Autocracy: No parties" ///
1 "Autocracy: One party" 2 "Autocracy: Multiple party" 3 "Democracy"
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label values legpartyaut4 legpartyaut4
label define strength4 0 "Not displaying strength" ///
1 "Displaying strength: One party" ///
2 "Displaying strength: Multiple party" 3 "Democracy"
label values strength4 strength4
label define leg3 0 "Autocracy: No legislature" ///
1 "Autocracy: Legislature" 2 "Democracy"
label values leg3 leg3
/*The table is constructed from these three tabulatures*/
latab leg3 coup if sample!=., row dec(1)
latab legpartyaut4 coup if sampledem!=., row dec(1)
latab strength4 coup if sampledem!=., row dec(1)
/*Table 4.2 Logistic regressions -- Basemodel*/
logit coup2 legdum if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2leg
logit coup2 legpartyaut if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2legp
logit coup2 strength if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2strength
logit coup2 onepartylp mpartylp if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2lp
logit coup2 onepartystr mpartystr if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2str
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logit coupsuc legdum if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2leg2
logit coupsuc legpartyaut if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2legp2
logit coupsuc strength if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2strength2
logit coupsuc onepartylp mpartylp if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2lp2
logit coupsuc onepartystr mpartystr if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2str2
esttab m2leg m2leg2 m2legp m2legp2 m2strength ///
m2strength2 m2lp m2lp2 m2str m2str2 ///
using "Tables/basemodel.tex", ///
b(3) eform ci label scalar(N) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Basemodel") replace
/*Defining control variables as macro*/




logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2leg
logit coup2 legpartyaut ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2lp
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logit coup2 strength ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2str
*******COUPS*******
logit coupsuc legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2leg2
logit coupsuc legpartyaut ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2lp2
logit coupsuc strength ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2str2
esttab m2leg m2leg2 m2lp m2lp2 m2str m2str2 ///
using "Regressiontables/coups111.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Coups") replace
/*Table 4.4*/
*******COUP ATTEMPTS*******
logit coup2 onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2lp
logit coup2 onepartystr mpartystr ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2str
*******COUPS*******
logit coupsuc onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2lp2
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logit coupsuc onepartystr mpartystr ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2str2
esttab m2lp m2lp2 m2str m2str2 ///
using "Regressiontables/coups.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Coups") replace
/*Table 4.5*/
/*Controls in macro*/
local controls2 regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2
*******COUP ATTEMPTS*******
logit coup2 createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 openaut coupinit2_open ///
‘controls2’ if sample==1, cluster(gwno)
est sto m2
*******COUPS*******
logit coupsuc createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 openaut coupinit2_open ///
‘controls2’ if sample==1, cluster(gwno)
est sto m22
esttab m2 m22 ///
using "Regressiontables/coupinitinteractionsNEW.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Party Creation") replace
/*Table 4.6*/
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logit coup2 ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m1star
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m1
esttab m1star m1 ///
using "Regressiontables/m1starandm1.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions") replace
/*TABLE 4.7 */
/* MODEL 1* */
/*Predictive power of model*/
/* Out-of-sample analysis */
/* Averaging over 10 seeds */
capture label define tradpred20 0 "P: NO" 1 "P: Yes"
capture label define tradpred15 0 "P: NO" 1 "P: Yes"
capture label define tradpred10 0 "P: NO" 1 "P: Yes"
capture drop include
gen include = 0
replace include = 1 if sample==1







gen sampler = uniform() if include == 1
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sort gwno
by gwno: egen gwno_sampler = mean(sampler)
gen estsample = 0
sum gwno_sampler
egen ds_median = median(gwno_sampler) if include == 1
replace estsample = 1 if gwno_sampler > ds_median
capture drop tradprob
capture drop tradpr*
quietly logit coup2 regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2 coupinit2 ///
if include==1 & estsample==1, or cluster(gwno)
predict tradprob, p
gen tradpred20 = 0 if tradprob >=0 & include == 1
replace tradpred20 = 1 if tradprob >= .20 & include == 1
gen tradpred15 = 0 if tradprob >=0 & include == 1
replace tradpred15 = 1 if tradprob >= .15 & include == 1
gen tradpred10 = 0 if tradprob >=0 & include == 1
replace tradpred10 = 1 if tradprob >= .10 & include == 1
lab var tradpred20 "p>20"
lab var tradpred15 "p>15"
lab var tradpred10 "p>10"
label values tradpred20 tradpred20
label values tradpred15 tradpred15
label values tradpred10 tradpred10
tab coup2 tradpred20 if estsample == 0, row col
tab coup2 tradpred15 if estsample == 0, row col
tab coup2 tradpred10 if estsample == 0, row col
}
/*MODEL 1*/
/*Predictive power of model*/
/* Out-of-sample analysis */
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/* Averaging over 10 seeds */
capture label define tradpred20 0 "P: NO" 1 "P: Yes"
capture label define tradpred15 0 "P: NO" 1 "P: Yes"
capture label define tradpred10 0 "P: NO" 1 "P: Yes"
capture drop include
gen include = 0
replace include = 1 if sample==1







gen sampler = uniform() if include == 1
sort gwno
by gwno: egen gwno_sampler = mean(sampler)
gen estsample = 0
sum gwno_sampler
egen ds_median = median(gwno_sampler) if include == 1
replace estsample = 1 if gwno_sampler > ds_median
capture drop tradprob
capture drop tradpr*
quietly logit coup2 legdum regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2 coupinit2 ///
if include==1 & estsample==1, or cluster(gwno)
predict tradprob, p
gen tradpred20 = 0 if tradprob >=0 & include == 1
replace tradpred20 = 1 if tradprob >= .20 & include == 1
gen tradpred15 = 0 if tradprob >=0 & include == 1
replace tradpred15 = 1 if tradprob >= .15 & include == 1
gen tradpred10 = 0 if tradprob >=0 & include == 1
replace tradpred10 = 1 if tradprob >= .10 & include == 1
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lab var tradpred20 "p>20"
lab var tradpred15 "p>15"
lab var tradpred10 "p>10"
label values tradpred20 tradpred20
label values tradpred15 tradpred15
label values tradpred10 tradpred10
tab coup2 tradpred20 if estsample == 0, row col
tab coup2 tradpred15 if estsample == 0, row col
tab coup2 tradpred10 if estsample == 0, row col
}
/*Table 4.8 Logistic regressions Model 1 with case indicators included*/
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ maxexclpop if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m1
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ limr_l if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ fh_cl_l if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m3
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ maxexclpop limr_l fh_cl_l if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m4
esttab m1 m2 m3 m4 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/casemodel.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions: M1 w/case indicators included") replace
/*Table 5.1 Continent by coup attempts: Autocracies only*/
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tab un_continent_l un_continent_name
lab var un_continent_l "Continent"
label define continent 2 "Africa" 19 "Americas" ///
142 "Asia" 150 "Europe" 9 "Oceania"
lab values un_continent_l continent
tab un_continent_name coup
latab un_continent_l coup if sample!=.
/*Table 5.2 Logistic regressions -- Robustness tests 1 */
/*Macro for robustness variables*/
local rob1 i.un_continent_l i.decade lnme
lab var lnme "Military spending"
lab var un_continent_l "Continent"
lab var decade "Decade"
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob1
logit coup2 onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, ///
or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob2
logit coup2 createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ///
‘controls2’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, cluster(gwno)
est sto rob3
logit coupsuc legdum ‘controls’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob11




logit coupsuc createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ///
‘controls’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, cluster(gwno)
est sto rob33
esttab rob1 rob11 rob2 rob22 rob3 rob33 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/robcheck2.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Coups") replace
/*Table 5.3: Fixed effects*/
xtlogit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1, fe
est sto fe1
xtlogit coup2 onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ if sample==1, fe
est sto fe4
xtlogit coupsuc legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1, fe
est sto fe6
xtlogit coupsuc strength ‘controls’ if sample==1, fe
est sto fe8
xtlogit coupsuc onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ if sample==1, fe
est sto fe9
local controls2 regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2
xtlogit coup2 createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ‘controls2’ if sample==1, fe
est sto fe11
xtlogit coupsuc createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ‘controls2’ if sample==1, fe
est sto fe12
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esttab fe1 fe6 fe4 fe9 fe11 fe12 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/fe.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Fixed effects") replace
/*Table 5.4: Polity dichotomized and ACLP*/
gen polity_di=.
replace polity_di=0 if p_polity2<6
replace polity_di =1 if p_polity2>5
tab p_polity2 polity_di
lab var polity_di "Polity dichotomy"
lab var chga_demo_l "ACLP dichotomy"
label define polity_di 0 "Autocracy" 1 "Democracy"
label values polity_di polity_di
label define chga_demo_l 0 "Autocracy" 1 "Democracy"
label values chga_demo_l chga_demo_l
latab polity_di chga_demo_l
/*Table 1 in Appendix 2*/
summ p_polity2 if type2_l==1 & sample!=.
gen type2polity=0
replace type2polity=1 if p_polity2>5 & type2_l==1
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ ///
if sample==1 & type2polity==0, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob1
logit coup2 onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ ///
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if sample==1 & type2polity ==0, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob2
logit coup2 createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ///
‘controls2’ if sample==1 & type2polity ==0, cluster(gwno)
est sto rob3
logit coupsuc legdum ‘controls’ ///
if sample==1 & type2polity ==0, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob11
logit coupsuc onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ ///
if sample==1 & type2polity ==0, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob22
logit coupsuc createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ///
‘controls2’ if sample==1 & type2polity ==0, cluster(gwno)
est sto rob33
esttab rob1 rob11 rob2 rob22 rob3 rob33 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/robchecktype2.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Coups") replace
/*Table 2 in Appendix 2*/
/*Institutionalized autocracies only*/
logit coup2 legpartyaut ‘controls’ if sample==1 & legdum==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m1
logit coup2 strength ‘controls’ if sample==1 & legdum ==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2
logit coupsuc legpartyaut ‘controls’ if sample==1 & legdum==1, or cluster(gwno)
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est sto m3
logit coupsuc strength ‘controls’ if sample==1 & legdum ==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m4
esttab m1 m3 m2 m4 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/instdiff.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Institutional differences") replace
/*Table 3 in Appendix 2*/
local controls regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2 coupinit2
logit coup2 noparty onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2lp
logit coup2 noparty onepartystr mpartystr ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2str
logit coupsuc noparty onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2lp2
logit coupsuc noparty onepartystr mpartystr ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto m2str2
esttab m2lp m2lp2 m2str m2str2 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/noparty.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- No party autocracies with legislature included") ///
replace
/*Table 4 in Appendix 2*/
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local rob2 i.un_continent_l i.decade
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ ‘rob2’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob1
logit coup2 onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ ‘rob2’ if sample==1, ///
or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob2
logit coup2 createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ///
‘controls2’ ‘rob2’ if sample==1, cluster(gwno)
est sto rob3
logit coupsuc legdum ‘controls’ ‘rob2’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob11
logit coupsuc onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ ‘rob2’ if sample==1, ///
or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob22
logit coupsuc createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ///
‘controls’ ‘rob2’ if sample==1, cluster(gwno)
est sto rob33
esttab rob1 rob11 rob2 rob22 rob3 rob33 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/robcheck8.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Coups") replace
/*Table 5 in Appendix 2*/
logit coup2 legpartyaut ‘controls’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto h2
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logit coup2 strength ‘controls’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto h4
logit coupsuc legpartyaut ‘controls’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto h22
logit coupsuc strength ‘controls’ ‘rob1’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto h42
esttab h2 h22 h4 h42 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/robcheck7.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Coups") replace
/*Table 5.5: Logistic regressions Robustness tests 2*/










gen sample=1 if leg!=. & legpartyaut!=. & strength!=. ///
& coupinit2!=. & l2_logmadgdpc!=. & l2_madgrpercent!=. ///





local controls regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2 coupinit2
local controls2 regdurspec l2_logmadgdpc ///
l2_madgrpercent prevcatt2
logit coup2 legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob1
logit coup2 onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob2
logit coup2 createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ///
‘controls2’ if sample==1, cluster(gwno)
est sto rob3
logit coupsuc legdum ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob11
logit coupsuc onepartylp mpartylp ‘controls’ if sample==1, or cluster(gwno)
est sto rob22
logit coupsuc createaut coupinit2 coupinit2_create2 ///
‘controls2’ if sample==1, cluster(gwno)
est sto rob33
esttab rob1 rob11 rob2 rob22 rob3 rob33 ///
using "Regressiontables/Robustness_spec/robcheckpolity.tex", ///
b(3) eform pr2 ci label scalar(N ll_0 ll) ///
star(+ 0.10 * 0.05 ** 0.01 *** 0.001) ///
title("Logistic regressions -- Coups") replace
